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Reverse Deception Pdf

Contribute to lacsec/eBook-1 development by creating an account on GitHub. Reverse Deception Organized Cyber Threat Counter. Exploitation 1st Edition windows vista questions and answers,wind shadows,winding frye kenneth g. if you are searched for the book by dr. max kilger, sean bodmer reverse deception: organized cyber threat counter-exploitation in pdf format, then you have come.

Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat Counter-Exploitation is a textbook which investigates two topics; first it provides methods and criteria to rectify Advanced Persistent Threats. Identified by Richard Austin in an IEEE review as a "masterful presentation of deception", [4] it is clear why this work is of interest to different governments with several currently involved in or considering future actions in weaponizing cyber capabilities. It appears on the recommended reading lists for notable U. Navy War College in the Counterintelligence: Other military organizations have made efforts in a similar manner. The authors introduce the first theory and model for classifying a threat on the opportunistic-APT continuum as either persistent on non-persistent. It is now widely used in the industry and is built off evaluation of these following criteria: Some additional content includes:

Much of this chapter is common sense for a seasoned security expert. At the very least read the section about Military Deception and skip the rest. Chapter 3 actually starts getting into the meat, and addresses Counterintelligence from the real world and works hard at applying those principles to the cyber world in the section, unsurprisingly titled, "Applying Counterintelligence to the Cyber Realm.

Chapter 4 mangles its way through applying Criminal Profiling with cyber criminal profiling. A quick read through is sufficient, unless you have a specific need to develop a plan for profiling all those threats your company are constantly getting hit with in which case you need a professional and not this book.

Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat Counter-Exploitation

This chapter could be an book in itself with it's own case studies Cockoo's Egg style of story telling is what I would want to see here with analysis sprinkled in to really show how this process is done but here it is not given much service with it's quick synopsis.

The end of this chapter provides the reader with three 3 pages of reference material, and the majority of them are actual criminal profiling books and articles. Chapter 5 addresses dealing with lawyers aka, read the law and involve your own lawyers early. Chapter 7 contains four case studies with postmortems to illustrate the concepts within the addressed case study.

Chapter 8 talks about tools that the security professional can use and a little synopsis about what they do, with some considerations on how to use said tool. Useful for beginners, anyone with experience can skim through this looking for some tool that they have not used yet.

Chapter 9 uses the SpyEye trojan as another case study in classifying threats and to spell out various steps that were taken to detect this threat, and how the trojan works. Funny enough, this chapter seems to be the directors cut of Damballa's blog post. From chapter 10 and on is the major selling point of the book.

eBook-1/Reverse goudzwaard.info at master · smilecs/eBook-1 · GitHub

Chapter 10 fills out Chapter 4 with more information about profiling, and delivers more information about actual cyber-intelligence to build profiles on attackers threatening organizations. This is more of what I was expecting from the book. Deceptive actions by one actor influence the behaviors of another actor, so deception is a form of influence and persuasion, although the target of the deception may be completely una-ware of being persuaded or influenced.

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Case Number New York: Market research shows consumer resistance or susceptibility to persuasion can be driven by processes that operate entirely outside the conscious. But there also will be greater deception and counterdeception possibilities for the more ingenious of good and bad actors.

Bloom Unlike traditional counterintelligence, " Almost every action in the cyber realm can be recorded, detected, identified, analyzed, replayed, tracked, and identified " Bodmer et al.

Bodmer et al. Skills and methods: Determining the skill level and methods used to gain access, leave, and maintain persistence, requires access to a Apr In this chapter we explore cyber-counterdeception cyber-CD , what it is, and how it works, and how to incorporate counterdeception into cyber defenses.

We review existing theories and techniques of counterdeception and relate counterdeception to the concepts of cyber attack kill chains and intrusion campaigns. Poder astuto: Dec Deception is a technique used to cause animals [9], human [13,35] or computer systems [3] to have false beliefs. The purpose of deception is to mislead the deceivees to behave against their interests but favorably to the deceiver. Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Deception: Feb Tao Zhang. Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information.

For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions between the players and quantitatively characterizes the conflicting incentives and strategic responses. In this chapter, we provide an overview of deception games in three different environments and extend the baseline signaling game models to include evidence through side-channel knowledge acquisition to capture the information asymmetry, dynamics, and strategic behaviors of deception.

We analyze the deception in binary information space based on a signaling game framework with a detector that gives off probabilistic evidence of the deception when the sender acts deceptively. We then focus on a class of continuous one-dimensional information space and take into account the cost of deception in the signaling game. We finally explore the multi-stage incomplete-information Bayesian game model for defensive deception for advanced persistent threats APTs.

We use the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium PBNE as the solution concept for the deception games and analyze the strategic equilibrium behaviors for both the deceivers and the deceivees.

Malware Forensics: Discovery of the Intent of Deception

Traditionally, these devices detect intruder activity and alert cybersecurity operations of the threat before any genuine resources are compromised. While the past effectiveness of these devices has been questioned Krawetz, ;McCarty, , they are currently resurging as central components in a new approach to cybersecurity known as deceptive security or reverse deception Bodmer et al. Is deceptive technology a paradigm shift in cybersecurity; or is this merely old wine in new bottles?

Jun Richard Baskerville. This paper describes a framework for evaluating the specific application of deceptive cybersecurity devices in particular design settings.

There is an innate asymmetry in the relationship between the advantages of an attacker and the disadvantages of the defender.

Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat Counter-Exploitation

The essential goal of cybersecurity is to increase the security of local information and information systems. One way of achieving this goal can be by increasing the amount of work required on the part of an attacker while decreasing the amount of work on the part of the defender.

You might also like: THE KISS OF DECEPTION EBOOK

New cybersecurity devices based on deceptive technologies aim to achieve this adjustment to the asymmetry. The framework embodies a theory that explains the principles that deceptive cybersecurity aims to achieve. Using probability of compromise as an indicator of the amount of work required on the part of an attacker, we evaluate the underlying mechanism of deceptive cybersecurity.

The degree of security provided by deceptive cybersecurity to a network cannot be evaluated only by considering the cybersecurity alone. Intruder characteristics must be included in the evaluation system, and by modeling their behavior and incentives, we can derive further qualitative and quantitative characteristics that help to objectively evaluate the effectiveness of deceptive cybersecurity configurations and devices. Malware, in particu us cyber-attacks factors [2]. Attack preparation with the target selection: Host observation ment: Other host penetration, off-the-record informat authority securement iscovery: Primary server and service confirmation a correction using port scanning tion: Data sent to the penetration system and exter encryption after correcting the primary data ack is authorization acquisition through the extortion o malware infection.

We analyze the network-threaten rst two phases of a six-phase APT attack. Jan APT attacks' forecasts and warning technologies are the most effective strategy to detect and analyze pre-attack indicators. Here, a study on a quantification framework for threatening conditions is necessary to being able to extract various network threatening elements. In this study, we collected data on security threatening elements to analyze network threatening elements.

We analyzed the limitations of pre-technologies to analyze the quantification technologies of pre-threatening conditions. We also categorized their degrees of risks by grading threatening elements to deduce a method of graded degrees of risks. Beyond Pattern Matching: Nov The ever-increasing sophistication in network attacks, combined with larger and larger volumes of traffic, presents a dual challenge to network intrusion detection systems IDSs.

On one hand, to take advantage of modern multi-core processing platforms IDSs need to support scalability, by distributing traffic analysis across a large number of processing units.

On the other hand, such scalability must not come at the cost of decreased effectiveness in attack detection. In this paper, we present a novel domain-specific concurrency model that addresses this challenge by introducing the notion of detection scope: The notion of scope enables IDSs to automatically distribute traffic processing, while ensuring that information necessary to detect intrusions remains available to detector instances.

We show that for a large class of detection algorithms, scope can be automatically inferred via program analysis; and we present scheduling algorithms that ensure safe, scope-aware processing of network events. We evaluate our technique on a set of IDS analyses, showing that our approach can indeed exploit the concurrency inherent in network traffic to provide significant throughput improvements.

Looking to the Future. This chapter outlines promising areas for advanced research and development.

Countering Denial and Deception. In this chapter we explore cyber-counterdeception cyber-CD , what it is, how it works, and how to incorporate it into cyber defenses. We review existing theories and techniques of counterdeception and adapt them for usage by cyber defenders in conjunction with their deception chains and deception campaigns.

Intrusions, Deception, and Campaigns. Cyber intrusions consist of cyber attack campaigns, composed of cyber kill chains, which include various cyber attacks, composed of multiple attacks steps.

The chapter concludes with an examination of how to advance mission goals across intrusion campaigns by developing deception campaigns. Cyber intrusion tactics and strategies have advanced considerably over the last two decades.

Analysts have drawn on empirical observations to formulate high-level models of cyber intrusions. The four-tiered pyramidal model of intrusions in Fig.

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