Translator's Introduction xxiii. O. Preliminary Note: The Scope of the. Critique of Judgment xxiii. 1. Kant's Life and Works xxvii. 2. The Critique of Pure Reason xxx. Free kindle book and epub digitized and proofread by Project Gutenberg. Immanuel Kant, Kant's Critique of Judgement, translated with Introduction and Facsimile PDF, MB, This is a facsimile or image-based PDF made from.

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Critique Of Judgment Pdf

This version of the Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant is licensed under a Although the Critique of Judgment advances a very sophisticated aesthetic. Kant's Critique of Judgment simultaneously reveals the internal limits of crit- Critique, Hegel disputes the legitimacy of Kant's division of the theoret-. 1. Kant's Life and Works xxvii. 2. The Critique of Pure Reason xxx. 3. The Critique of Practical Reason xxxix. 4. The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment: Background.

The pleasure, however, is of a distinctive kind: it is disinterested, which means that it does not depend on the subject's having a desire for the object, nor does it generate such a desire. But the disinterested character of the feeling distinguishes them from other judgments based on feeling. In particular, it distinguishes them from i judgments of the agreeable, which are the kind of judgment expressed by saying simply that one likes something or finds it pleasing for example, food or drink , and ii judgments of the good, including judgments both about the moral goodness of something and about its goodness for particular non-moral purposes. The fact that judgments of beauty are universally valid constitutes a further feature in addition to the disinterestedness of the pleasure on which they are based distinguishing them from judgments of agreeable. For in claiming simply that one likes something, one does not claim that everyone else ought to like it too. But the fact that their universal validity is not based on concepts distinguishes judgments of beauty from non-evaluative cognitive judgments and judgments of the good, both of which make a claim to universal validity that is based on concepts. This is closely related to the point that their universality is not based on concepts. Running through Kant's various characterizations of judgments of beauty is a basic dichotomy between two apparently opposed sets of features. On the one hand, judgments of beauty are based on feeling, they do not depend on subsuming the object under a concept in particular, the concept of a purpose which such an object is supposed to satisfy , and they cannot be proved. This combination of features seems to suggest that judgments of beauty should be assimilated to judgments of the agreeable. On the other hand, however, judgments of beauty are unlike judgments of the agreeable in not involving desire for the object; more importantly and centrally, they make a normative claim to everyone's agreement. These features seem to suggest that they should be assimilated, instead, to objective cognitive judgments. Kant's insistence that there is an alternative to these two views, one on which judgments of beauty are both based on feeling and make a claim to universal validity, is probably the most distinctive aspect of his aesthetic theory.

So rather than perceiving the object as green or square, the subject whose faculties are in free play responds to it perceptually with a state of mind which is non-conceptual, and specifically a feeling of disinterested pleasure. It is this kind of pleasure which is the basis for a judgment of taste.

Kant appeals to this account of pleasure in the beautiful in order to argue for its universal validity or universal communicability: to argue, that is, that a subject who feels such a pleasure, and thus judges the object to be beautiful, is entitled to demand that everyone else feel a corresponding pleasure and thus agree with her judgment of taste.

We are entitled to claim that everyone ought to agree with our cognitions: for example, if I perceptually cognize an object as being green and square, I am entitled to claim that everyone else ought to cognize it as green and square. But in order for this demand for agreement to be possible, he suggests, it must also be possible for me to demand universal agreement for the subjective condition of such cognitions. If I can take it that everyone ought to share my cognition of an object as green or square, then I must also be entitled to take it that everyone ought to share a perception of the object in which my faculties are in free play, since the free play is no more than a manifestation of what is in general required for an object's being cognized as green or square in the first place.

The most serious objection to the argument can be put in the form of a dilemma; see for example Guyer , p. Either the free play of the faculties is involved in all cognitive perceptual experience, or it is not. If it is, then it would seem, counterintuitively, that every object should be perceived as beautiful.

But if it is not, then the central inference does not seem to go through.

From the fact that I can demand agreement for the state of my faculties in experiencing an object as, say, green or square, it does not follow that I can demand agreement for a state in which my faculties are in free play, since the possibility of experiencing the free play would seem to require something over and above what is required for cognition alone. Most defenders of the argument have grasped the second horn of the dilemma. One such defence, originally proposed by Ameriks in his subsequently incorporated into Ameriks , relies on an understanding of judgments of taste as objective, and hence as making a claim to universal agreement which is akin to that made by cognitive judgments.

For more on the objectivity of taste, see Section 2. Another, offered by Allison, rejects the objection as presupposing an overly strong interpretation of what the Deduction is intended to accomplish.

The objection tells against the Deduction only if it is construed as entitling us to claim universal agreement for particular judgments of taste; but, as Allison reads it, the Deduction is intended only to establish that such claims can, in general, be legitimate Allison , ch. A similar position is taken by Kalar , However, some commentators have taken this kind of defence to be inadequate, holding that the argument must establish not only a general entitlement to demand agreement for judgments of beauty, but an entitlement in each particular case Savile , Chignell Another option for defending the argument would be to grasp the first horn, accepting that, on Kant's account, every object can legitimately be judged to be beautiful.

Gracyk argues, independently of the argument of the Deduction, that this is Kant's view, and it might also be noted that, if judgments of beauty are not objective, there can be no feature of an object which rules it out as a candidate for being legitimately found beautiful. However, approaches along these lines have not figured prominently in the literature on the Deduction. A number of commentators have taken the dilemma, or considerations related to it, to be fatal to Kant's view that judgments of beauty make a legitimate claim to universal validity: see for example Meerbote , cited above and Guyer , pp.

Others have argued that Kant's view can be saved by drawing on considerations not mentioned in the official argument of the Deduction. As noted below Section 2. Another strategy drawing on considerations outside the Deduction itself is to appeal to Kant's theory of aesthetic ideas see Section 2.

This strategy is adopted in Savile and Chignell ; Chignell's view differs from Savile's in that it does not make any appeal to moral considerations. The assessment of the objection, and of Kant's Deduction of Taste more generally, is complicated by a number of more fundamental interpretive issues, which are discussed in the next section. Although these issues are central to understanding the core of Kant's view, readers seeking a more general survey of Kant's aesthetics can omit this section.

Critique of judgment

This seems to imply that the pleasure is distinct from the act of judging, and more specifically that the pleasure precedes the judging: we first feel pleasure, and then claim, perhaps based on characteristics of the pleasure such as its disinterestedness , that the pleasure is universally valid and hence that the object is beautiful.

An approach along these lines is developed in detail by Paul Guyer, who draws on passages elsewhere in the text to defend the view that a judgment of taste results from two distinct acts of reflective judgment, the first identifiable with the free play of the faculties and resulting in a feeling of pleasure, the second an act of reflection on the pleasure which results in the claim that the pleasure is universally communicable.

See his , especially pp. This implies that the act of judging which precedes the pleasure must be one in which the subject takes her state of mind to be universally communicable, requiring us to identify it with the judgment of taste proper rather than with an activity of the faculty prior to that judgment.

This requires addressing the textual difficulty just mentioned. In its identification of the pleasure and the judgment the view is like that of Richard Aquila , see especially and, more recently, Robert Wicks , 43—45 , although neither Aquila nor Wicks explicitly endorses the apparent consequence, that the pleasure or judgment must involve a claim to its own universal communicability.

However, rather than understand the pleasure as awareness of its own universal communicability, Longuenesse takes it to be awareness of a prior, and independent, feeling of pleasure elicited by the free play of the faculties, so that there are two distinct feelings of pleasure involved in judging an object to be beautiful , —; , pp. Allison objects also that the one-act view fails to accommodate judgments of the ugly; for more on Kant's views on the ugly, see Section 2.

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Criticisms of Ginsborg's one-act approach are also to be found in Pippin , Ameriks , Palmer , Vandenabeele , Sweet and Makkai Imagination in the free play, he says, conforms to the general conditions for the application of concepts to objects that are presented to our senses, yet without any particular concept being applied, so that imagination conforms to the conditions of understanding without the constraint of particular concepts.

It is left to commentators to try to explain how such an activity is intelligible and why, if it is indeed intelligible, it should give rise to, or be experienced as, a feeling of pleasure.

Some commentators try to make sense of the free play by appealing to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience, for example to the kind of experience involved in appreciating an abstract painting, where the subject might imaginatively relate the various elements of the painting to one another and perceive them as having an order and unity which is non-conceptual; see for example Bell , p. Others try to find a place for it in the context of Kant's theory of the imagination as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason.

As with the deduction of taste see Section 2. A particularly detailed and thorough treatment of this approach is offered in Rogerson for an earlier and briefer treatment, see Rogerson Many commentators assume, whether tacitly or explicitly, that the free play of imagination and understanding represents a natural psychological process, taking place in time and thus subject to natural causal laws.

Kant's Critique of Judgement by Immanuel Kant

But it is hard to reconcile this understanding of the free play with Kant's appeal to it to justify the legitimacy of judgments of beauty, and more generally his claim to be offering a transcendental account of judgments of beauty, one which shows such judgments to be founded on an a priori principle.

Guyer's approach to the free play, from his onwards, has been thoroughly naturalistic; in his he offers a very explicit defence of this approach, arguing that we should reject Kant's claim to establish an a priori or transcendental principle justifying judgments of beauty, and instead regard Kant's theory of aesthetics as a contribution to the empirical psychology of taste. While this kind of view is rarely explicitly endorsed, many commentators do in fact offer accounts of the free play which at least resemble empirical psychological accounts, raising the question of how Guyer's conclusion is to be avoided.

The views touched on in this section represent only a sampling of the various accounts of the free play which have been offered.

A variety of still more recent approaches to the free play are summarized and discussed in Guyer According to Guyer, the answer is no see especially , pp. Although Kant sometimes describes pleasure as awareness of the free play of the faculties, Guyer takes the relation between the free play and the feeling of pleasure to be merely causal.

While many commentors follow Guyer on this point, opposing views have been taken by e. Kant suggests that a judgment of taste demands agreement in the same way that an objective cognitive judgment demands agreement see e. But one might still raise questions about the character of the demand, either because there are in turn questions to be raised about what it is for a cognitive judgment to claim agreement, or because it is not clear that the claim can in fact be the same, given that in the aesthetic case one is claiming that others share one's feeling, as opposed to demanding that they apply the same concept to the object.

The objection tells against the Deduction only if it is construed as entitling us to claim universal agreement for particular judgments of taste; but, as Allison reads it, the Deduction is intended only to establish that such claims can, in general, be legitimate Allison , ch. A similar position is taken by Kalar , However, some commentators have taken this kind of defence to be inadequate, holding that the argument must establish not only a general entitlement to demand agreement for judgments of beauty, but an entitlement in each particular case Savile , Chignell Another option for defending the argument would be to grasp the first horn, accepting that, on Kant's account, every object can legitimately be judged to be beautiful.

Gracyk argues, independently of the argument of the Deduction, that this is Kant's view, and it might also be noted that, if judgments of beauty are not objective, there can be no feature of an object which rules it out as a candidate for being legitimately found beautiful.

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However, approaches along these lines have not figured prominently in the literature on the Deduction. A number of commentators have taken the dilemma, or considerations related to it, to be fatal to Kant's view that judgments of beauty make a legitimate claim to universal validity: see for example Meerbote , cited above and Guyer , pp.

Others have argued that Kant's view can be saved by drawing on considerations not mentioned in the official argument of the Deduction. As noted below Section 2.

Another strategy drawing on considerations outside the Deduction itself is to appeal to Kant's theory of aesthetic ideas see Section 2.

This strategy is adopted in Savile and Chignell ; Chignell's view differs from Savile's in that it does not make any appeal to moral considerations. The assessment of the objection, and of Kant's Deduction of Taste more generally, is complicated by a number of more fundamental interpretive issues, which are discussed in the next section. Although these issues are central to understanding the core of Kant's view, readers seeking a more general survey of Kant's aesthetics can omit this section.

This seems to imply that the pleasure is distinct from the act of judging, and more specifically that the pleasure precedes the judging: we first feel pleasure, and then claim, perhaps based on characteristics of the pleasure such as its disinterestedness , that the pleasure is universally valid and hence that the object is beautiful. An approach along these lines is developed in detail by Paul Guyer, who draws on passages elsewhere in the text to defend the view that a judgment of taste results from two distinct acts of reflective judgment, the first identifiable with the free play of the faculties and resulting in a feeling of pleasure, the second an act of reflection on the pleasure which results in the claim that the pleasure is universally communicable.

See his , especially pp. This implies that the act of judging which precedes the pleasure must be one in which the subject takes her state of mind to be universally communicable, requiring us to identify it with the judgment of taste proper rather than with an activity of the faculty prior to that judgment.

This requires addressing the textual difficulty just mentioned. In its identification of the pleasure and the judgment the view is like that of Richard Aquila , see especially and, more recently, Robert Wicks , 43—45 , although neither Aquila nor Wicks explicitly endorses the apparent consequence, that the pleasure or judgment must involve a claim to its own universal communicability.

However, rather than understand the pleasure as awareness of its own universal communicability, Longuenesse takes it to be awareness of a prior, and independent, feeling of pleasure elicited by the free play of the faculties, so that there are two distinct feelings of pleasure involved in judging an object to be beautiful , —; , pp. Allison objects also that the one-act view fails to accommodate judgments of the ugly; for more on Kant's views on the ugly, see Section 2.

Criticisms of Ginsborg's one-act approach are also to be found in Pippin , Ameriks , Palmer , Vandenabeele , Sweet and Makkai Imagination in the free play, he says, conforms to the general conditions for the application of concepts to objects that are presented to our senses, yet without any particular concept being applied, so that imagination conforms to the conditions of understanding without the constraint of particular concepts.

It is left to commentators to try to explain how such an activity is intelligible and why, if it is indeed intelligible, it should give rise to, or be experienced as, a feeling of pleasure. Some commentators try to make sense of the free play by appealing to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience, for example to the kind of experience involved in appreciating an abstract painting, where the subject might imaginatively relate the various elements of the painting to one another and perceive them as having an order and unity which is non-conceptual; see for example Bell , p.

Others try to find a place for it in the context of Kant's theory of the imagination as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. As with the deduction of taste see Section 2. A particularly detailed and thorough treatment of this approach is offered in Rogerson for an earlier and briefer treatment, see Rogerson Many commentators assume, whether tacitly or explicitly, that the free play of imagination and understanding represents a natural psychological process, taking place in time and thus subject to natural causal laws.

But it is hard to reconcile this understanding of the free play with Kant's appeal to it to justify the legitimacy of judgments of beauty, and more generally his claim to be offering a transcendental account of judgments of beauty, one which shows such judgments to be founded on an a priori principle. Guyer's approach to the free play, from his onwards, has been thoroughly naturalistic; in his he offers a very explicit defence of this approach, arguing that we should reject Kant's claim to establish an a priori or transcendental principle justifying judgments of beauty, and instead regard Kant's theory of aesthetics as a contribution to the empirical psychology of taste.

While this kind of view is rarely explicitly endorsed, many commentators do in fact offer accounts of the free play which at least resemble empirical psychological accounts, raising the question of how Guyer's conclusion is to be avoided. The views touched on in this section represent only a sampling of the various accounts of the free play which have been offered. A variety of still more recent approaches to the free play are summarized and discussed in Guyer According to Guyer, the answer is no see especially , pp.

Although Kant sometimes describes pleasure as awareness of the free play of the faculties, Guyer takes the relation between the free play and the feeling of pleasure to be merely causal. While many commentors follow Guyer on this point, opposing views have been taken by e.

Kant suggests that a judgment of taste demands agreement in the same way that an objective cognitive judgment demands agreement see e. But one might still raise questions about the character of the demand, either because there are in turn questions to be raised about what it is for a cognitive judgment to claim agreement, or because it is not clear that the claim can in fact be the same, given that in the aesthetic case one is claiming that others share one's feeling, as opposed to demanding that they apply the same concept to the object.

Guyer argues that the claim should be understood as a rational expectation or ideal prediction: someone who judges an object to be beautiful is claiming that under ideal circumstances everyone will share her pleasure , pp.

Savile and Chignell follow Guyer in understanding the claim in this way. Guyer's understanding of the claim has been criticized by a number of commentators, including Rogerson , Ginsborg , ch. But this approach, which is perhaps closest to the letter of Kant's text, raises a question: what kind of normativity is this, if not that associated with morality or, more generally, practical rationality?

It is tempting to assimilate it to cognitive or epistemic normativity, where this in turn might be understood as the normativity involved in the putative principles that one ought to believe what is true, or, alternatively, what is justified in light of the evidence.

However this appears to conflict with Kant's commitment to the subjectivity and relatedly nonconceptuality of judgments of taste. To avoid the conflict, while preserving the link Kant seems to assert between the normativity of aesthetic judgment and that of cognitive judgment, we need an understanding of the normativity such that it is a necessary condition of cognition that we be able to make such normative demands for agreement, yet without the normativity's simply being identified with the cognitive or epistemic normativity associated with truth and justification.

Granted, pace Guyer, that the claim is normative without being moral, further questions can be raised about its strength and character. Moran understands the demand as reflecting a sense of obligation or requirement, distinct from moral obligation, but stronger than that present in the case of empirical cognitive judgment.

He reads Kant as drawn towards a view on which the beautiful object itself makes an unconditional demand on the viewer's attention of a kind made vivid in the narrator's vow to the hawthorns in Proust's In Search of Lost Time , although he also takes Kant's denial of the objectivity of taste to debar him from endorsing such a view. A similar suggestion is made in Makkai : she takes Kant to hint at the idea that the beauitful object is found to deserve, or call for, recognition as beautiful, where this implies a claim on the viewer which goes beyond any claim implicit in an objective judgment.

Roughly, on the view suggested by Moran and Makkai, the claim implicit in a judgment of beauty is not merely the conditional claim that others, if they perceive the object, ought to judge it to be beautiful; it is the unconditional claim that others ought to perceive it and, in so doing, judge it to be beautiful. The idea that Kant takes us to be subject to a demand to attend to beautiful objects is also put forward in Kalar , but Kalar understands that demand as one of two distinct normative demands made in the judgment of beauty: a non-moral demand to feel pleasure in the given object, and a further moral demand to attend to the object , p.

Should judgments of beauty be regarded as objective? Similar views are proposed by Savile and Kulenkampff ; see also the references offered by Ameriks at , n. And this Kant saw before he had proceeded very far with the Critique of Practical Reason; and in consequence he adopted a threefold classification of the higher mental faculties based on that given by previous psychologists.

Knowledge, feeling, desire, these are the three ultimate modes of consciousness, of which the second has not yet been described. And when we compare this with the former triple division which we took up from the Aristotelian logic, we see that the parallelism is significant. And this suggests that the Judgement corresponds to the feeling of pleasure and pain; it occupies a position intermediate between Understanding and Reason, just as, roughly speaking, the feeling of pleasure is intermediate between our perception of an object and our desire to possess it.

And so the Critique of Judgement completes the whole undertaking of criticism; its endeavour is to show that there are a priori principles at the basis of Judgement just as there are in the case of Understanding and of Reason; that these principles, like the principles of Reason, are not constitutive but only regulative of experience, i.

By this means, nature is regarded by us as if its particular empirical laws were not isolated and disparate, but connected and in relation, deriving their unity in seeming diversity from an intelligence which is at the source of nature.

It is only by the assumption of such a principle that we can construe nature to ourselves; and the principle is then said to be a transcendental condition of the exercise of our judging faculty, but valid only for the reflective, not for the determinant Judgement.

It gives us pleasure to view nature in this way; just as the contemplation of chaos would be painful. But this purposiveness may be only formal and subjective, or real and objective. In some cases the purposiveness resides in the felt harmony and accordance of the form of the object with the cognitive faculties; in others the form of the object is judged to harmonise with the purpose in view in its existence. That is to say, in the one case we judge the form of the object to be purposive, as in the case of a flower, but could not explain any purpose served by it; in the other case we have a definite Edition: It is a curious literary parallel that St.

Augustine hints Confessions iv. Both, however, may be brought under the higher category of things that are reckoned purposive by the Judgement. We have here then, in the first place, a basis for an a priori Philosophy of Taste; and Kant works out its details with great elaboration. He borrowed little from the writings of his predecessors, but struck out, as was ever his plan, a line of his own.

Of other writers on Beauty, he only names Batteux and Lessing. Following the guiding thread of the categories, he declares that the aesthetical judgement about Beauty is according to quality disinterested; a point which had been laid down by such different writers as Hutcheson and Moses Mendelssohn.

As to quantity, the judgement about beauty gives universal satisfaction, although it is based on no definite concept. The universality is only subjective; but still it is there. The maxim Trahit sua quemque voluptas does not apply to the pleasure afforded by a pure judgement about beauty.

As to relation, the characteristic of the object called beautiful is that it betrays a purposiveness without definite purpose. The pleasure is a priori, independent on the one hand of the charms of sense or the emotions of mere feeling, as Winckelmann had already declared; and on the other hand is a pleasure quite distinct from that taken which we feel when viewing perfection, with which Wolff and Baumgarten had identified it.

By his distinction between free and dependent beauty, which we also find in the pages of Hutcheson, Kant further develops his doctrine of the Edition: Finally, the satisfaction afforded by the contemplation of a beautiful object is a necessary satisfaction. This necessity is not, to be sure, theoretical like the necessity attaching to the Law of Causality; nor is it a practical necessity as is the need to assume the Moral Law as the guiding principle of conduct.

But it may be called exemplary; that is, we may set up our satisfaction in a beautiful picture as setting an example to be followed by others. It is plain, however, that this can only be assumed under certain presuppositions.

We must presuppose the idea of a sensus communis or common sense in which all men share. As knowledge admits of being communicated to others, so also does the feeling for beauty.

For the relation between the cognitive faculties requisite for Taste is also requisite for Intelligence or sound Understanding, and as we always presuppose the latter to be the same in others as in ourselves, so may we presuppose the former. The analysis of the Sublime which follows that of the Beautiful is interesting and profound; indeed Schopenhauer regarded it as the best part of the Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement.

The general characteristics of our judgements about the Sublime are similar to those already laid down in the case of the Beautiful; but there are marked differences in the two cases. If the pleasure taken in beauty arises from a feeling of the purposiveness of the object in its relation to the subject, that in sublimity Edition: Nothing in nature is sublime; and the sublimity really resides in the mind and there alone. Indeed, as true Beauty is found, properly speaking, only in beauty of form, the idea of sublimity is excited rather by those objects which are formless and exhibit a violation of purpose.

A distinction not needed in the case of the Beautiful becomes necessary when we proceed to further analyse the Sublime. For in aesthetical judgements about the Beautiful the mind is in restful contemplation; but in the case of the Sublime a mental movement is excited pp. This movement, as it is pleasing, must involve a purposiveness in the harmony of the mental powers; and the purposiveness may be either in reference to the faculty of cognition or to that of desire.

In the former case the sublime is called the Mathematically Sublime—the sublime of mere magnitude—the absolutely great; in the latter it is the sublime of power, the Dynamically Sublime. Gioberti, an Italian writer on the philosophy of Taste, has pushed this distinction so far as to find in it an explanation of the relation between Beauty and Sublimity. In both cases, however, we find that the feeling of the Sublime awakens in us a feeling of the supersensible destination of man.

The objects of nature, he continues, which we call sublime, inspire us with a feeling of pain rather than of pleasure; as Lucretius has it—.

As no extraneous charm must mingle with the satisfaction felt in a beautiful object, if the judgement Edition: Switzerland had not then become the recreation-ground of Europe; and though natural beauty was a familiar topic with poets and painters it was not generally recognised that taste has also to do with the sublime. And it is not a little remarkable that the man who could write thus feelingly about the emotions inspired by grand and savage scenery, had never seen a mountain in his life.

The power and the insight of his observations here are in marked contrast to the poverty of some of his remarks about the characteristics of beauty. For instance, he puts forward the curious doctrine that colour in a picture is only an extraneous charm, and does not really add to the beauty of the form delineated, nay rather distracts the mind from it.

His criticisms on this point, if sound, would make Flaxman a truer artist than Titian or Paolo Veronese. But indeed his discussion of Painting or Music is not very appreciative; he was, to the end, a creature of pure Reason. Upon the analysis he gives of the Arts, little Edition: Art differs from Science in the absence of definite concepts in the mind of the artist. It thus happens that the great artist can rarely communicate his methods; indeed he cannot explain them even to himself.

Poeta nascitur, non fit; and the same is true in every form of fine art. Genius is, in short, the faculty of presenting aesthetical Ideas; an aesthetical Idea being an intuition of the Imagination, to which no concept is adequate. And it is by the excitation of such ineffable Ideas that a great work of art affects us. The main question with which the Critique of Judgement is concerned is, of course, the question as Edition: That nature appears to be full of purpose is mere matter of fact.

It displays purposiveness in respect of our faculties of cognition, in those of its phenomena which we designate beautiful.

And also in its organic products we observe methods of operation which we can only explain by describing them as processes in which means are used to accomplish certain ends, as processes that are purposive. In our observation of natural phenomena, as Kuno Fischer puts it, we judge their forms aesthetically, and their life teleologically.

We may either say that it was actually designed to be beautiful by the Supreme Force behind Nature, or we may say that purposiveness is not really resident in nature, but that our perception of it is due to the subjective needs of our judging faculty.

We have to contemplate beautiful objects as if they were purposive, but they may not be so in reality. And this latter idealistic doctrine is what Kant falls back upon. He appeals in support of it, to the phenomena of crystallisation pp.

The beauty of a rock crystal is apparently produced without any forethought on the part of nature, and Edition: Mechanism can do so much; may it not do all? But no one could maintain that from this definition it follows that we are not compelled to postulate design in the mind of the artist who paints a beautiful picture. If we watch, e. The operations of nature in organised bodies seem to be of an entirely different character from mere mechanical processes; we cannot construe them to ourselves except under the hypothesis that nature in them is working towards a designed end.

The language of biology eloquently shows the impossibility of eliminating at least the idea of purpose from our investigations into the phenomena of life, growth, and reproduction. A doctrine, like that of Epicurus, in which every natural phenomenon is regarded as the result of the blind drifting of atoms in accordance with purely mechanical laws, Edition: It has been urged by Kirchmann and others that this distinction between Technic and Mechanism, on which Kant lays so much stress, has been disproved by the progress of modern science.

The doctrines, usually associated with the name of Darwin, of Natural Selection and Survival of the Fittest, quite sufficiently explain, it is said, on mechanical principles the semblance of purpose with which nature mocks us. The presence of order is not due to any purpose behind the natural operation, but to the inevitable disappearance of the disorderly.

It would be absurd, of course, to claim for Kant that he anticipated the Darwinian doctrines of development; and yet passages are not wanting in his writings in which he takes a view of the continuity of species with which modern science would have little fault to find.

But he is careful to add that such a theory, even if established, would not eliminate purpose from the universe; it would indeed suggest that certain special processes having the semblance of purpose may be elucidated on mechanical principles, but on the whole, purposive operation on the part of Mother Nature it would still be needful to assume p.

Crude materialism thus affording no explanation of the purposiveness in nature, we go on to ask what other theories are logically possible. We may dismiss at once the doctrine of Hylozoism, according to which the purposes in nature are explained Edition: For such a doctrine is self-contradictory, inasmuch as lifelessness, inertia, is the essential characteristic of matter, and to talk of living matter is absurd p.

A much more plausible system is that of Spinoza, who aimed at establishing the ideality of the principle of natural purposes. He regarded the world whole as a complex of manifold determinations inhering in a single simple substance; and thus reduced our concepts of the purposive in nature to our own consciousness of existing in an all-embracing Being. But on reflection we see that this does not so much explain as explain away the purposiveness of nature; it gives us an unity of inherence in one Substance, but not an unity of causal dependence on one Substance p.

And this latter would be necessary in order to explain the unity of purpose which nature exhibits in its phenomenal working. Spinozism, therefore, does not give what it pretends to give; it puts us off with a vague and unfruitful unity of ground, when what we seek is a unity that shall itself contain the causes of the differences manifest in nature.

We have left then as the only remaining possible doctrine, Theism, which represents natural purposes as produced in accordance with the Will and Design of an Intelligent Author and Governor of Nature. Thus the contemplation of natural purposes, i. He regards it as a necessary assumption for the guidance of scientific investigation, no less than for the practical needs of morals; but he does not admit that we can claim for it objective validity.

In the language of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Idea of God furnishes a regulative, not a constitutive principle of Reason; or as he prefers to put it in the present work, it is valid only for the reflective, not for the determinant Judgement. We ask then, whence arises this impossibility of objective statement?

It is in the true Kantian spirit to assert that no synthetical proposition can be made with reference to what lies above and behind the world of sense; but there is a difficulty in carrying out this principle into details. For all we know it may only indicate our way of looking at things, and may point to no corresponding objective reality.

That we are forced by the limited nature of our faculties to view nature as working towards ends, as purposive, does not prove that it is really so. We cannot justify such pretended insight into what is behind the veil. It is to be observed, however, that precisely similar arguments might be urged against our affirmation of purpose, design, will, as the spring of the actions of other human beings.

We see that the external behaviour of other men is similar to our own, and that the most reasonable way of accounting for such behaviour is to suppose Edition: I can by no means prove to the determinant Judgement that the complex of sensations which I constantly experience, and which I call the Prime Minister, is anything more than a well-ordered machine.

It is improbable that this is the case—highly improbable; but the falsity of such an hypothesis cannot be proved in the same way that we would prove the falsity of the assertion that two and two make five. But then though the hypothesis cannot be thus ruled out of court by demonstration of its absurdity, it is not the simplest hypothesis, nor is it that one which best accounts for the facts.

The assumption, on the other hand, that the men whom I meet every day have minds like my own, perfectly accounts for all the facts, and is a very simple assumption. It merely extends by induction the sphere of a force which I already know to exist. But, as has been said before, this argument, though entirely convincing to any sane person, is not demonstrative; in Kantian language and on Kantian principles the reasoning here used would seem to be valid only for the reflective and not for the determinant Judgement.

If the principle of design or conscious adaptation of means to ends be not a constitutive principle of experience, but only a regulative principle introduced to account for the facts, what right have we to put it forward dogmatically as affording an explanation of the actions of other human beings? For, he argues, that in comparing the actions of men and the lower animals, or in comparing the actions of one man with those of another, we are not pressing our analogy beyond the limits of experience.

Men and beasts alike are finite living beings, subject to the limitations of finite existence; and hence the law which governs the one series of Edition: But the power at the basis of Nature is utterly above definition or comprehension, and we are going beyond our legitimate province if we venture to ascribe to it a mode of operation with which we are only conversant in the case of beings subject to the conditions of space and time.

He urges in short that when speaking about man and his mind we thoroughly understand what we are talking about; but in speaking of the Mind of Deity we are dealing with something of which we have no experience, and of which therefore we have no right to predicate anything. But it is apparent that, as has been pointed out, even when we infer the existence of another finite mind from certain observed operations, we are making an inference about something which is as mysterious an x as anything can be.

The action of the latter we understand to a large extent; but we do not understand the action of mind, which yet we know from daily experience of ourselves does produce effects in the phenomenal world, often permanent and important effects. Briefly, the action of mind upon matter Edition: Hence the causality of mind is a vera causa; we bring it in to account for the actions of other human beings, and by precisely the same process of reasoning we invoke it to explain the operations of nature.

And it is altogether beside the point to urge, as Kant does incessantly, that in the latter case the intelligence inferred is infinite; in the former only finite. All that the Design Argument undertakes to prove is that mind lies at the basis of nature. There is always a difficulty in any argument which tries to establish the operation of mind anywhere, for mind cannot be seen or touched or felt; but the difficulty is not peculiar to that particular form of argument with which theological interests are involved.

The real plausibility of this objection arises from a vague idea, often present to us when we speak of infinite wisdom or infinite intelligence, namely that the epithet infinite in some way alters the meaning of the attributes to which it is applied.

But the truth is that the word infinite, when applied to wisdom or knowledge or any other intellectual or moral quality, can only properly have reference to the number of acts of wisdom or knowledge that we suppose to have been performed. The only sense in which we have any right to speak of infinite Edition: And so when we speak of infinite intelligence, we have not the slightest warrant, either in logic or in common sense, for supposing that such intelligence is not similar in kind to that finite intelligence which we know in man.

The positive side of his teaching on Theism is summed up in the following sentence p. It is therefore the constant principle of the mind to assume as true that which it is necessary to presuppose as condition of the possibility of the highest moral final purpose.

But I have endeavoured to indicate at what points he does not seem to me to have gone as far as even his own declared principles would justify him in going.

Kant, however, in the Critique of Judgement is sadly fettered by the chains that he himself had forged, and frequently chafes under the restraints they impose. He indicates more than once a point of view higher than that of the Critique of Pure Reason, from which the phenomena of life and mind may be contemplated. He had already hinted in that work that the supersensible substrate of the ego and the non-ego might be identical.

That is to say, he maintains that to explain the phenomena of organic life and the purposiveness of nature we must hold that the world of sense is not disparate from and opposed to the world of thought, but that nature is the development of freedom. The connexion of nature and freedom is suggested by, nay is involved in, the notion of natural adaptation; and although we can arrive at no knowledge of the supersensible substrate of both, yet such a common ground there must be.

This principle is the starting-point of the systems which followed that of Kant; and the philosophy of later Idealism is little more than a development of the principle in its consequences. When we give what may be called a mechanical elucidation of any natural phenomenon, we begin with its parts, and from what we know of them we explain the whole.

But in the case of certain objects, e. In their case we can only account for the parts by a reference to the whole. Now, were it possible for us to perceive a Edition: But our Understanding is not able to do this, and its inadequacy for such a task leads us to conceive the possibility of an Understanding, not discursive like ours, but intuitive, for which knowledge of the whole would precede that of the parts.

Hence, although Mechanism and Technic must not be confused and must ever stand side by side in our scientific investigation of natural law, yet must they be regarded as coalescing in a single higher principle incognisable by us.

For, while at one time he seemed to be bent on limiting our faculties of knowledge in the narrowest way, at another time he pointed, as it were with a side gesture, beyond the limits which he himself had drawn. Kant, however, though he approaches such a position more than once, can never be said to have risen to it. The two lines of proof, he holds, are quite distinct; and nothing but confusion and intellectual disaster can result from the effort to combine them.

The moral proof stands by itself, and it needs no such crutches as the argument from Design can offer. But, as Edition: Kennedy has pointed out in his acute criticism 1 of the Kantian doctrine of Theism, it would not be possible to combine a theoretical disbelief in God with a frank acceptance of the practical belief of His existence borne in upon us by the Moral Law.

Kant himself admits this: That He is, is certain; what He is, we cannot determine. No doubt it may be urged that since the practical and theoretical arguments both arrive at the same conclusion, the cogency of our reasoning in the latter should confirm our trust in the former. But true conclusions may sometimes seem to follow from quite insufficient premises; and Kant is thus justified in demanding that each argument shall be submitted to independent tests. I have endeavoured Edition: And that the witness of conscience affords the most powerful and convincing argument for the existence of a Supreme Being, the source of law as of love, is a simple matter of experience.

Induction, syllogism, analogy, do not really generate belief in God, though they may serve to justify to reason a faith that we already possess.

The poet has the truth of it:. I give at the end of this Introduction a Glossary of the chief philosophical terms used by Kant; I have tried to render them by the same English equivalents all through the work, in order to preserve, as far as may be, the exactness of expression in the original. I am conscious that this makes the translation clumsy in many places, but have thought it best to sacrifice elegance to precision. This course is the more necessary to adopt, as Kant cannot be understood unless his nice verbal distinctions be attended to.

I have printed Judgement with a capital letter when it signifies the faculty, with a small initial when it signifies the act, of judging. The text I have followed is, in the main, that printed by Hartenstein; but occasionally Rosenkranz preserves the better reading.

All important variants between the First and Second Editions have been indicated at the foot of the page. A few notes have been added, which are enclosed in square brackets, to distinguish them from those which formed part of the original work.

My best thanks are due to Rev. Kennedy and Mr.

Free [PDF] Downlaod The Critique of Judgement (Part One, The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement)

Purser for much valuable aid during Edition: And I am under even greater obligations to Mr. Mahaffy, who was good enough to read through the whole of the proof; by his acute and learned criticisms many errors have been avoided.

Others I have no doubt still remain, but for these I must be accounted alone responsible. It will be indispensable to future students. An excellent account of the significance, in the Kantian system, of the Urtheilskraft, by Mr. Macmillan, appeared in ; and Mr. Meredith has published recently an English edition of the Critique of Aesthetical Judgement, with notes and essays, dealing with the philosophy of art, which goes over the ground very fully.

Some critics of my first edition took exception to Edition: I have, however, abandoned the attempt to preserve the word Kritik in English, and have replaced it by Critique or criticism, throughout.

Kant's Critique of Judgement by Immanuel Kant - Free Ebook

The other changes that have been made are mere corrections or emendations of faulty or obscure renderings, with a few additional notes. I have left my original Introduction as it was written in , without attempting any fresh examination of the problems that Kant set himself. We may call the faculty of cognition from principles a priori, pure Reason, and the inquiry into its possibility and bounds generally the Critique of pure Reason, although by this faculty we only understand Reason in its theoretical employment, as it appears under that name in the former work; without wishing to inquire into its faculty, as practical Reason, according to its special principles.

That [Critique] goes merely into our faculty of knowing things a priori, and busies itself therefore only with the cognitive faculty to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire; and of the cognitive faculties it only concerns itself with Understanding, according to its principles a priori, to the exclusion of Judgement and Reason as faculties alike belonging to theoretical cognition , because it is found in the sequel that no other cognitive faculty but the Understanding can furnish constitutive principles of cognition a priori.

The Critique, then, which sifts them all, as regards the share which each of the other faculties might pretend to have in the clear possession of knowledge from its own peculiar root, leaves nothing but what the Understanding prescribes a priori as law for nature as the complex of phenomena whose form also is Edition: It relegates all other pure concepts under Ideas, which are transcendent for our theoretical faculty of cognition, but are not therefore useless or to be dispensed with.

For they serve as regulative principles; partly to check the dangerous pretensions of Understanding, as if because it can furnish a priori the conditions of the possibility of all things which it can know it had thereby confined within these bounds the possibility of all things in general; and partly to lead it to the consideration of nature according to a principle of completeness, although it can never attain to this, and thus to further the final design of all knowledge.

It was then properly the Understanding which has its special realm in the cognitive faculty, so far as it contains constitutive principles of cognition a priori, which by the Critique, comprehensively called the Critique of pure Reason, was to be placed in certain and sole possession 1 against all other competitors.

And so also to Reason, which contains constitutive principles a priori nowhere except simply in respect of the faculty of desire, should be assigned its place in the Critique of practical Reason.

Whether now the Judgement, which in the order of our cognitive faculties forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason, has also principles a priori for itself; whether these are constitutive or merely regulative thus indicating no special realm ; and whether they give a rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and pain, as the mediating link between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire just as the Understanding Edition: A Critique of pure Reason, i.

For if such a system is one day to be completed under the general name of Metaphysic which it is possible to achieve quite completely, and which is supremely important for the use of Reason in every reference , the soil for the edifice must be explored by Criticism as deep down as the foundation of the faculty of principles independent of experience, in order that it may sink in no part, for this would inevitably bring about the downfall of the whole.

We can easily infer from the nature of the Judgement whose right use is so necessarily and so universally requisite, that by the name of sound Understanding nothing else but this faculty is meant , that it must be attended with great difficulties to find a principle peculiar to it; some such it must contain a priori in itself, for otherwise it would not be set apart by the commonest Criticism as a special cognitive faculty.

This principle must not be derived a priori from concepts, for these belong to the Understanding, and Judgement is only concerned with their application. It must, therefore, furnish of itself a concept, through which, properly Edition: This perplexity about a principle whether it is subjective or objective presents itself mainly in those judgements that we call aesthetical, which concern the Beautiful and the Sublime of Nature or of Art. And, nevertheless, the critical investigation of a principle of Judgement in these is the most important part in a Critique of this faculty.

For although they do not by themselves contribute to the knowledge of things, yet they belong to the cognitive faculty alone, and point to an immediate reference of this faculty to the feeling of pleasure or pain according to some principle a priori; without confusing this with what may be the determining ground of the faculty of desire, which has its principles a priori in concepts of Reason.

And so, though in this case such a principle a priori can and must be applied to the cognition of the beings of the world, and opens out at the same time prospects which are advantageous for the practical Reason, yet it has no immediate reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain. But Edition:

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