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Another key Javanese figure of the period is Ranggawarsita , the last of the great Court poets in the city of Surakarta. One of the most interesting among his many works is Wirid Hidayat Jati. There are certain elements in this work designed to please those Muslims more concerned with the exterior zahir sciences: God is Creator, God is omnipotent, God is One. However, the mystical flavour of this work is still paramount.
The framework of the seven grades of being appears; the sequence of created things are presented as seven stages, with the number seven allocated the importance found in much mystical thought.
His works were to be promoted by reformist minded Malay Muslims over years after his death though publishing and distribution. Another window into Malay world Islam from the colonial period is provided by Leiden Cod. This manuscript belonged to Sultan Mahmud Shah, who assumed the Acehnese throne in It provides valuable data on the activities and theological interests of Acehnese religious scholars connected with the court just prior to the commencement of the Aceh War.
The work attributes its theological basis to the teachings of Ahmad al-Qushashi It portrays a monistic view of the Creator and his creation, and makes repeated references to the seven grades. This text provides evidence of a continuing tension between monist thought and reformed Sufism, which was to make a further upsurge of reformist thinking likely. Discussion of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Malay world would not be complete without considering the work of Raja Ali Haji of Riau , best known for his historical writings.
In early adulthood, Raja Ali Haji came to be regarded as a religious authority, deriving from his extensive early education in the Islamic sciences and Arabic language Osman, He was instrumental in recruiting many teachers of Islam from outside the region to Draft Only — Not for Citation 6 teach in Riau, and as a result of his efforts and those of his colleagues, Riau gained a reputation as a place where orthodox Islam flourished Andaya and Matheson Raja Ali Haji became a very prominent member of the Riau branch of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order, and much of the focus within his writings was designed to urge pious living according to the precepts of Islam, and thus to promote reformed Sufism.
Raja Ali Haji was an arch conservative in his views. He portrayed his society as in an advanced state of decay, and presented the society of the prophet Muhammad as an ideal which individuals should strive to attain.
Furthermore, the century witnessed a surge in immigration to Southeast Asia from the Arab world, particularly from the Hadhramaut. Finally, Arab scholars in Arabia issued increasing numbers of long-distance legal opinions, or fatawa, on wide-ranging topics in response to enquiries received from the Malay world Cf.
Kaptein and Such developments made a significant contribution to a gradual restructuring of Malay Islamic thinking. We have seen how Sufi thinking, both in radical monist and reformed varieties, dominated the Malay Islamic arena during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The challenge to this status quo was to pick up momentum in the late nineteenth century, and assert itself in the twentieth century. Muhammad al-Nawawi al-Jawi was born in Banten in West Java, the son of a village religious official penghulu.
He spent his early years on the island of Java studying in various locations. In his late teens, he undertook the pilgrimage to Arabia, and stayed there initially for three years before returning to Java. He returned to Mecca to settle there permanently around He undertook further studies in Mecca, Egypt and Syria, then established himself there as a teacher Snouck Hurgronje While he does not appear to have shared the strong anti-Sufi views of some of his contemporaries, neither did he present Sufi approaches to the faith as normative, as did earlier teachers in the region such as Ahmad al-Qushashi.
For example, he did not actively urge his students to join Sufi orders. Though his lessons included selections from the great Sufi masters, especially al-Ghazali, he avoided those writings which were inclined to attract accusations of heterodoxy, such as the writings of the leading monists. He was thus paying due respect to the Wahhabite Arabian environment in which he found himself.
A change was taking place in terms of Malay Islamic education. Draft Only — Not for Citation 7 Al-Nawawi wrote exclusively in Arabic, and is reputed to have produced at least ninety-nine works Nasution Many are still included in the reading materials of reformist pesantrens in Indonesia Aboebakar He also issued many fatawa, or legal judgements, for his Malay audience both in Mecca and in Southeast Asia.
This work was completed in and, after receiving the sanction of scholars in Mecca and Cairo, was first published in the latter city. The fact that official sanction was obtained from religious authorities in Mecca and Cairo provides some insight into the character of this work.
Both of these cities in the late nineteenth century had become dominated by reformist thinking which was taking an increasingly anti-Sufi hue. Al-Nawawi contributed to a breaking of the Southeast Asian Sufi mould, as it were. His influence on Malay scholars returning to Southeast Asia contributed to the momentous changes which were about to take place in Southeast Asian Islam. He was born in Patani, and spent around thirty- five years studying and teaching in Mecca and Medina Nasution He was a prolific writer, and many of his works, which altogether numbered at least fifty-seven Azra , are still widely printed and used in Southeast Asia.
His writings covered wide ranging topics. Ahmad Patani was another Meccan based Patani scholar. He studied in both Cairo and Mecca, where by the mids he had risen to become supervisor of the Malay Printing Press under the Turkish authorities Matheson and Hooker He taught many Malay students in Mecca, the most famous of whom was Muhammad Yusuf , later known as Tok Kenali.
Of considerable significance was his letter-based dialogue with Malay Muslims on important issues relating to the faith, a medium of communication which was to play a vital role in the spread of reformist thinking from Arabia to the Malay world.
Also worthy of note at this juncture is the significant contribution made by Arab immigrants to the Malay world. Yahya Sayyid Uthman encountered opposition from some Malay Muslims as a result of his vehement criticism of Sufi practice in the Malay world. He launched a highly polemical attack on the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order. His view brought him into conflict with mystics among the local group of religious scholars who regarded his attacks as a threat to their position.
The various societies in the Malay world were conservative, and ruling structures and paradigms were firmly entrenched during the periods examined thus far in this paper. In the Islamic theological arena, Sufis continued to hold centre stage during most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as had been the case during the previous two centuries.
Old debates continued to be played out, especially the tension between a reformed Sufism and radical theosophical doctrines. However, the old world familiar to Southeast Asian Muslims underwent rapid change during the nineteenth century.
Colonial powers gained varying degrees of control over the daily lives of Malay Muslims, with dramatic results. Old dogmas came to be increasingly put to the test and were found wanting. As the nineteenth century closed, new solutions were sought for the new problem of external colonial domination. Furthermore, new theological approaches were explored as the dominance of a culture of continuity gave way to a new culture of change.
These dramatic changes resulting from colonialism heralded the end of the dominance of Sufism and the onset of a mood for theological reform. The process was still in its infancy in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In a sense, this period represents a bridge between two eras. Increasing contacts occurred between local rulers and the Ottoman Caliphate authorities in Turkey. Indonesian Muslims looked increasingly to the religious authorities in the world- wide Islamic community for guidance in their developing struggle against Dutch rule.
Modernist ideas were increasingly implanting themselves in the Malay- Indonesian world around this time. There is considerable evidence for this, and indeed the transmission was not merely to be a transferral of ideas which then developed in isolation in Southeast Asia, but rather it was to take the form of a Draft Only — Not for Citation 9 continuing dialogue between Malay Muslims and those of the Middle East where the modernist ideas had originated.
Bluhm-Warn ff has tracked the dialogue between Malay Muslims and the editors of the reformist periodical al-Manar in Egypt. The Malay individuals in question wrote seeking advice and legal judgements on a range of theological issues, economic and environmental matters, technological advances, issues of current political concern such as patriotism and nationalism, and a range of other matters.
Kaptein has devoted attention to a similar phenomenon between the Malay world and Mecca. The concern of the Southeast Asian writers in addressing these issues for resolution to the Middle East demonstrates two things: firstly, the perception from Southeast Asia of authority lying in the Arab world, and secondly a confidence in seeking and obtaining support from fellow Muslims in the face of conflict with non-Muslim authorities as well as with traditional Muslim leaders.
The ongoing Middle Eastern influence upon reformist developments in Southeast Asia was reinforced by the arrival in the Malay world of Ahmad Surkati, a Sudanese who had studied in both Mecca and Medina and who came to Java in as the inspector of Islamic schools as part a scholarship program sponsored by the Ottoman authorities and available for Indonesian Muslims to study in the Middle East.
Surkati had a major impact upon the developments within the modernist movement in Indonesia. He was a close associate of Ahmad Dachlan, who founded the Muhammadiyah in , and indeed Surkati had a great influence upon the Muhammadiyah during its early period.
The traditional leaders of Malay society, the Sultans, were not the only group to be targeted for criticism by the young modernists, who termed themselves the Kaum Muda Young Generation.
They also directed strong and sustained criticism towards the Kaum Tua Old Generation traditionalists who appeared to them to protect and defend unquestioningly the domination of conservative religious scholars in the sphere of Islamic worship and belief.
This region had long served as a channel for new ideas coming from the Middle East into the Malay world. A number of leading Minang scholars based themselves in Mecca, such as Shaykh Ahmad Khatib , and exerted the kind of influence on visiting Malay students as we saw earlier with Muhammad al-Nawawi. He also attacked features of Minang customary law which he considered as unislamic, such as the inheritance law within the matrilineal structure of Minang society Djamal ff.
The pre-independence nationalist movements were then faced with the task of translating ideologies into structures of state, and several features are worthy of note at this juncture. First, in contrast with efforts to break the link between ethnicity and religion by earlier modernist thinkers, Malaya, then Malaysia, enshrined this link in its constitution. Second, the post-independence period witnessed ongoing rivalry between traditionalists and modernists in seeking to hold the centre of the Islamic stage.
Furthermore, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed the evolution of neo-modernist Islamic thinking in Malaysia and Indonesia. Early signs of this were reflected in the struggle by some Indonesian Muslims, supported by Indonesian non-Muslim leaders, in favour of establishing the principle of an officially multi-religious state, arguing against the priority of Islam.
This is most clearly seen in the Pancasila concept developed by Sukarno in and established as the philosophy of the Indonesian State. Thus the old world was gradually being swept away by the new modes of Islamic thinking. Traditional authority structures were being challenged, as was the right of Sufi approaches to hold centre stage on the Malay theological arena.
However, categories are subject to debate, and labels are used in different ways by different scholars. The long-established division between modernists and traditionalists has been challenged by much recent scholarship, which considers variously that three or four broad categories have emerged Abdillah The materials examined for this present paper suggest a four-fold typology, which still affirms a core division between modernism and conservative traditionalism, but which adds the categories of neo-modernism Draft Only — Not for Citation 11 and radical Islamism.
Tendencies to reformist thinking are not the exclusive preserve of any single category, but rather manifest themselves within each of the four groups, as will be seen from the discussion which follows. In order to provide focus, discussion will be devoted to the Indonesian context. This stream emerged in Indonesia in the late s and s, with its leaders drawn from graduates of the traditionalist pesantren or madrasah schools Barton Jalaluddin Rakhmat, a leading Indonesian scholar of Islam, points to certain specific viewpoints shared by Indonesian neo-modernists.
These values need to be agreed by non-Muslims as well as Muslims, in the view of the neo-modernists. Overall, the neo-modernists are more concerned with the essence of Islamic teaching than its form. Thus debate over whether women should wear the hijab is not considered as important as ethical lifestyles.
Neo- modernists are more positively disposed to Western liberal thought; they prioritise social and economic interests over political power and they cooperate with secular groups Schwarz Harun Nasution was one of the most prominent Indonesian Neo- Modernists of the twentieth century. He was born in Pematang Siantar, Sumatra, and spent periods in both Dutch and Islamic system schools before undertaking university studies in the Middle East. Dissatisfied with studies of the Islamic sciences at Al-Azhar University, Nasution transferred himself to the American University of Cairo, where he completed undergraduate studies with majors in education and sociology.
Nasution then entered the diplomatic service of the government of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia. In he returned to Cairo to undertake studies of Islamic Law. Under his leadership, the IAIN in Jakarta developed a dynamic, modern curriculum, combining studies of the traditional Islamic sciences with subjects drawn from modern western educational models such as Sociology, Anthropology, Comparative Religion and secular Philosophy Saeed Martin, Woodward and Atmaja In this way he demonstrated a certain measure of courage which characterised his writing throughout his long career.
Another key Neo-Modernist is Nurcholish Madjid His early education included both government and pesantren schools, followed by undergraduate studies at the IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta, majoring in Arab literature. Arguably his most influential initiative has been his establishment in of the Paramadina Foundation Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina , for which he is Chairman.
Paramadina serves as a think-tank, issuing press statements, speeches and a range of published materials via hardcopy, audio and internet media, commenting on wide-ranging issues related to Islam and the modern world. Nurcholish has been a prolific writer, producing various books and a vast number of published articles. He gives support to the established modernist call for Islam to engage with modern times.
Nurcholish argues for the ultimate separation of Islam and politics. The state is one Draft Only — Not for Citation 13 of the aspects of worldly life whose dimension is rational and collective, while religion is an aspect of another kind of life whose dimension is spiritual and personal. The Modernists The second stream of Islamic thought which deserves separate discussion is that of the Modernist Reformists. This group, descending from the modernist revolution in Islamic thought which emerged in Egypt at the beginning of the twentieth century, is very critical of traditionalist Islam on two counts: first, for what is seen as syncretistic practices among some traditionalists, which modernists consider to cause decay in the faith, and second, for the traditionalist penchant for taqlid or uncritical following of the dictates of religious leaders at the expense of creatively engaging with the Islamic scriptures Barton Modernists tend to draw their support from urban populations, and regard Western liberal thought — and that of Muslim neo-modernists — with suspicion, as they consider the latter to risk selling out on important aspects of the faith.
They are committed to consolidating Islam as a powerful political force, but are committed to constitutional processes. The prominent Indonesian political figure Dr Amien Rais serves as a late twentieth century representative of this group to supplement those figures from the earlier part of the century discussed previously.
He was born in , and received his school education in a Muhammadiyah school in Solo. In my opinion, this is a good sign. So, Bismillah in the name of Allah I braved myself to be the one to say it. Amien Rais has written a vast number of articles in newspapers and journals.
Cakrawala Islam: Antara Cita dan Fakta , his first book, comprises a selection of his essays which address a range of Islamic issues and challenges. These place a particular focus upon political issues and matters of state and the role of Islam in the modern world. His second volume, Tauhid Sosial: Formula Menggempur Kesenjangan , appeared after Rais had been occupying the position of Chairman of Muhammadiyah for some years, and it therefore gives an invaluable insight into the thinking at the upper echelons of that organisation.
The Traditionalists The third stream of Islamic thought is that of conservative traditionalism. On the other they include a response to these syncretistic practices from traditionalist clerics, who urge a closer adherence to scriptural dictates, and above all obedience to established religious leadership.
The primary non-political voice for orthodox traditionalism in Indonesian has long been the NU, which was established in Thus Islam fits within the structure of Indonesia, rather than the reverse as would be insisted upon by radical Islamists, discussed below.
The membership of this organisation currently stands at around thirty million Mujiburrahman , with the NU controlling an extensive educational system comprising pesantren, which encompasses kindergartens, junior high schools, senior high schools, nineteen universities and twenty-six other academic institutions Mangkey In spite of the history of NU traditionalism, in recent years young NU cadres have become more responsive to new ideas and the challenges of modernity.
This is partly due to the increasing influence of activist non-government organisations NGO via the pesantren system of Islamic schools run by the NU. It establishes agreements with pesantrens, using them as a focus of community development work, and also runs regular seminars and workshops halaqah focusing on social issues in the context of Islamic jurisprudence fiqh , such as the fiqh of land, the fiqh of tax, and the fiqh of just leadership Effendi H Fachurrozi focuses on treating Islamic scholars santri suffering from mental illnesses.
The healing methods represent a mix of alternative medicines and mystical practice Kurniawan Another body which articulates the conservative traditionalist viewpoint is the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars Majelis Ulama Indonesia - MUI , which gathers together religious leaders at various levels from across the archipelago.
Nevertheless, within such a body varying voices can be heard, representing the different streams of Islamic thought being examined within these pages. The Radical Islamists The fourth and final stream of Islamic thought which we will examine is that of the Islamists. This is the group which attracts much international media attention, and is variously referred to according to degrees of commitment as extremist, fundamentalist, radical, or Islamist.
This group may work within the democratic system, but is ultimately committed to replacing such a system with Islamic structures, allocating a priority to Islamic Law, leadership by Muslims, and primacy of Islamic scriptural injunctions. For most of the twentieth century a clearly discernible radical Islamist movement has not been a significant part of the Southeast Asian Islamic stage.
Draft Only — Not for Citation 16 This does not mean that such a phenomenon has been entirely absent. Radical Islamists have never looked like gaining power in any Southeast Asian Muslim society. And the Islamist calls for revolution, so prevalent in the Middle East in the latter half of the twentieth century, have been absent from mainstream opposition groups such as the political party PAS in Malaysia and the social organisation Muhammadiyah in Indonesia.
However, the s witnessed a discernible surge in Southeast Asian Islamist activity, particularly following the fall of President Suharto in During this period, Islamists were marginalized and considered as fascists… Suharto at this time was also anti-Islam… Later Suharto changed. Various scholars have pointed out the different dimensions of POS. Tarrow defines political opportunity structures as: According to McAdam, the openness and the closure of political systems are amongst the most salient factors of POS, which is influential in determining the movement emergence.
Comparative Perspectives, p. Under such circumstances, the political system is not fully open or the political openness has not been institutionalised. Nonetheless, the capacity of the regime to suppress the movement has declined significantly, thereby opening new opportunities for collective action. In short, social movements do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they rely heavily on external conditions that provide opportunities for collective action.
As a social movement, PKS is not a spontaneous gathering because before it emerged in public there is a series of socio-political processes which overtime contributed to its development. The international context of political opportunities helped to structure the domestic possibilities for the development of PKS.
In this regard, alongside the domestic factors outlined above, the following international dimensions help to explain the emergence of Tarbiyah and its current political wing, PKS. The first international impetus for Islamic revivalism in Indonesia that facilitated the emergence of Tarbiyah is the triumph of the Islamist revolution in Iran.
As was suggested by many scholars, the revival of Islam was perceived as a popular assertion of Muslim identity against Western political and cultural dominance. As a result of the Iranian revolution, revivalists in many Muslim countries felt that it was now possible for Islamic forces to overthrow Western-supported regimes —such as that of the Shah which adopted a secular autocratic state— and they were inspired to do so in their own countries.
Another international factor that helped the emergence of the Tarbiyah was the strengthening of links between the modernist-Islamist groups DDII and Saudi Arabia. As noted in the previous chapter, DDII played a vital role in establishing the campus dakwah movement. Having said that the Iranian revolution was proudly welcomed in many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia, Saudi Arabia sought to spread its political and religious influence across the Muslim world in order to counter the increasing dominance of Iran.
First of all, we think that the Iranian revolution was the triumph of Islam. Among other things, in the s DDII sent a number of students to undertake Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia with scholarships provided by the kingdom.
At this time, Islamic activism and enthusiasm, called al-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah Islamic awakening , gripped Saudi universities. The Brotherhood activists played a key role in filling the gap, especially in education where they designed educational systems and curriculum at schools and universities in the country. Who are the Islamists? Its lecturers in the s and s were mostly inspired by the Brotherhood thinking and the majority of books in the library were written by members of the Brotherhood.
HMI helped their Malaysian counterparts to organize several dakwah training trips to Jakarta and Bandung. Dakwah among the Students, Pelanduk Publications, Malaysia, p. It is worth pointing out that in spite of bringing those translating books to Indonesia, Imaduddin had a very important role in influencing Malaysian students toward the totality of Islam.
Zainah wrote that Imaduddin developed selected groups of Islamic students in Malaysia and began to conduct religious circles. See, Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, pp. Agus Salim and Dr. To begin with, I will discuss two domestic factors that directly enhanced the emergence of Tarbiyah: I will also point 24 Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October These domestic factors will be discussed in the following contexts: The first notable domestic factor that led to the emergence of campus dakwah was the proscription of explicit Islamic political expressions.
Clear evidence of this can be found in a number of political maneuvers, including: In addition to this, Suharto had repeatedly proven his capacity to suppress dissident voices.
Hundreds of protesters led by Amir Biki were shot at by the military as they demonstrated against military personnel who tore down brochures advocating that Muslim women should wear Islamic 26 Asiaweek, July 5, Long suppressed under authoritarian rule, a few Islamic activists became more radicalised and went underground.
In the early s, student protests intensified. Kakuei Tanaka in Jakarta. In , large-scale student unrest emerged, including at the Bandung Institute of Technology ITB that led the military to occupy campuses.
Several student leaders were arrested and put in jail. The extensive use of administrative and coercive powers prevented critical Islamic groups as well as Islamic students from engaging in explicit political activism. As a reaction to such a hostile environment, some of them undertook to 28 Ibid. In terms of resource mobilisation, which draws primarily upon rational choice theory, coercive force and repression raise the costs and risks of participation and consequently depress collective action.
Hence, the presence of campus dakwah can best be understood as a rejection of the regime. Overall, these were all strategic choices of actions as a result of the harsh realities of repression under the New Order.
While the first two domestic factors are related to external political pressures imposed by the Suharto regime, the following domestic changes are primarily concerned with the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices.
Indeed the trend of Islamic revivalism among students in the early s was also related to events and socio-political changes in the world-wide Muslim community. The sources of these phenomena did, however, have local impetus. First of all, the phenomenon of the Islamic turn in Indonesia was fueled by rapid economic development under Suharto. The real gross domestic product had expanded by over percent compared to the previous regime.
Terrence H. Hull and Gavin W.
William Skinner, ed. In a further development, the emergence of international events that led to Islamic resurgence like the triumph of Islamist revolution in Iran in brought influences to many predominantly Muslim countries.
In Indonesia, as elsewhere, the process of Islamic revivalism began to affect students in secular universities who come from various backgrounds. Instead, they were more likely to call themselves Muslims without applying an adjective, in an effort not to Village Indonesia, Cornell University Modern Indonesian Project, Ithaca, Since the late s, the Suharto regime began responding positively to demands from various Islamic organisations.
The Ministry of Religious Affairs presented to parliament a bill expanding the authority of Islamic courts. It also published a compilation of Islamic law. The Catholic editor of the weekly popular tabloid Monitor was put in jail for three years for announcing a poll which discredited the Prophet Muhammad as the 11th most admired person below President Suharto.
The birth of ICMI in the late , above all, was perceived as the most striking evidence of the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life.
In , Suharto himself moved his public identity towards Islam by undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca, and then adopting the name Haji Muhammad Suharto. See also, R. The crisis was markedly evident in the dramatic decline in the value of Indonesian currency rupiah.
Thousands of enterprises, from small to large-scale businesses, collapsed. Since the outbreak of the crisis, people became increasingly frustrated by miserable socio-economic conditions.
Unemployment levels jumped to the highest level since the s. As a result of the sharp increase in prices, the number of people living below the poverty line increased to around 50 percent of the total population. The crisis was a trigger for a series of student demonstrations.
Reformasi Total, Mentari, Jakarta, The crisis did not only cause an increase in poverty, unemployment and food shortages, but also put the state in a vulnerable and weak position unable to overcome the social tensions that escalated and exploded into larger-scale violent riots throughout the archipelago. Suharto was finally forced to resign from office and B. J Habibie was then sworn in as the President of Indonesia on 21 May Facing strong opposition from various quarters due to his close association with Suharto, Habibie was forced to conduct a fair and transparent election as soon as possible.
PK also seized the momentum of the removal of Pancasila as the sole basis by announcing Islam as the official basis of the new Islamist party. By applying the political opportunity framework, the use of these kinds of organisations is most often seen in less democratic political systems where overt protest and visible institutions are more vulnerable to suppression.
Finally, following the fall of Suharto in , Tarbiyah advocates seized the momentum by establishing PK, now known as PKS, to pursue their ideals within the framework of a democratic system. Illustration 4 Caption: Nonetheless, political opportunities alone do not make a movement. Even the most conducive political environment will be to no avail if the movement does not have sufficient organisation and networks to realise its political potential. The study of means has come to be known as resource mobilisation1 or mobilising structure approaches.
In an attempt to describe the organisational strength of PKS, I will emphasise its cadres, organisational models and leadership, communication networks and financial assets. Unfortunately, there is little agreement on the definition of resources. In his definition, Tilly argues that one of the most important resources of mobilisation is the formal and informal networks that connect individuals and movement organisations.
McCarthy, and Mayer N. Most commonly, resources refer to material resources, most notably time and money. In addition to this, I follow two categories of resource mobilisation, that is, material and immaterial resources, which include: Massachusetts, , p.
Nonetheless, a focus on social movement theories in Western traditions tends to equate social movement organisations SMOs with formal and visible organisations,16 thereby neglecting informal forms of collective action. Braungart ed. Given that these aforementioned forms of Tarbiyah organisational activity have been mentioned in Chapter 2, in this section I will discuss them very briefly, and just focus on the perspective of resource mobilisation.
First of all, the spirit of Islamic revivalism among Islamic students in secular universities began to flourish from the s with the establishment of a dakwah network centred in campus mosques. Through mosques, the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices among students was facilitated. They prayed together and congregated for the khutbah Friday sermons in mosques as well as conducted a number of religious study circles and trainings such as liqa meeting every week , mabit staying the whole night at mosques , daurah training program.
This intensive religious training attracted a large number of students and its alumni were spread out not only in Java, but also in Sumatra. Interestingly, since LDK was a formal student organisation established on campus, it became automatically one of the Student Activity Units Unit 19 Ibid.
As an officially recognised student body, LDK was used by dakwah activists to carry out regular recruitment campaigns among incoming students. The straight victories of dakwah activists in securing student senate positions both at the faculty and university level at UI have inspired their colleagues in other prestigious universities, such as ITB, IPB, and UGM to take over the student senates on their own campuses. The formation of KAMMI signaled that Tarbiyah was beginning gradually to expand its networks with campus dakwah groups, allowing its activists to take to 22 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, , pp.
Since the formation of PK, all Tarbiyah members automatically became PK members and all religious circles and training activities were taken over by PK. The complexities emerged immediately after the party set up its organisational structures. In general, Tarbiyah resembled an isolated SMO, which had no branches and relied heavily on direct contact between its members, which 23 Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, See also, Klandermans, The Social Psychology, , pp.
They said that the features of the structure are the following: See, Klandermans, The Social Psychology, , p. The formal composition of DPP is a president, a deputy president, department heads, secretary general and treasurer. There are over members on the full DPP. The four highest levels are called kader inti, core cadres who have the right to vote for the Majelis Syuro representatives.
The four highest levels called core cadres are granted opportunities to vote for the Council. Unfortunately, some provinces do not have enough core cadres so that they cannot elect their own representatives in the Council. Accordingly, in order to represent them, the elect-members of the Council select their representatives. Interestingly, PKS also operates at the lowest level of government, that is, at village levels desa or kelurahan by forming village-level branches called Dewan Pimpinan Ranting DPRa.
The ability of PKS to set up local party units nation-wide shows that it began gradually to expand its organisational structures and networks in order to attract new voters other than PKS traditional voters.
The PKS general- secretary Anis Matta claimed that the party successfully increased their votes in in sub-districts or villages where new PKS branches had been found.
Accordingly, in the run-up to the elections, Matta predicted that PKS sub-district level 39 Suharto argued that the political parties were always trying to gain mass support for the sake of their own political interests. Likewise, the presence of party conflicts in the past had harmed village people.
The issuance of Article Mo. Ironically, the ruling party Golkar was exempted from this limitation so that they could reach all the village people day-to-day activities. Dissertation at Hawaii University, Unlike New Order parties i. Golkar, PPP and PDI-P44 which took advantage of a government decision permitting them to keep their existing assets and party offices,45 PKS had to build up its branch structures from scratch, using relatively new personnel and infrastructures.
However, the secretive nature of Tarbiyah during Suharto period and its lack of assets and infrastructure relative to NU and Muhammadiyah, mean that it was less able to give PK a flying start. Similarly, despite PAN styling itself as a pluralist party, it benefited from its close links to the largest Modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah.
Muhammadiyah, for instance, is well-known as the century-old, 30 million-strong Islamic organisation with its immense network of social services. The chairman of Muhammadiyah Prof.
There are at least five departments in the DPP. These organisations are under the supervision and coordination of the treasurer. For more information of PKPU, visit its official website http: For a detailed description of BSMI, visit this link www.
Other parties are catching up with the mobilisation of youth and students too. Golkar Party, for example, has the Multipurpose Cooperative of Mutual Assistance Kosgoro whose main supporters are youth. However, most other organisations affiliated with political parties do not function well.
This is largely because PKS is unusual parties whose cadres are ideologically motivated people and are required to rise through a series of intensive trainings. Undoubtedly, the aforementioned extensive networks linked to PKS demonstrate the proliferation of Islamic professional associations.
Within this network of institutions, professional and non-professional associations linked to PKS have been particularly successful, providing social and medical services to many people. Through its ideologically motivated cadres, PKS has also run schools called SDIT as well as provided financial aid through small cooperatives koperasi.
Indeed, other parties occasionally provide relief to victims of natural disasters. Unlike PKS, however, their assistance is temporary and non-institutionalised. More significantly, these PKS-affiliated organisations and professional associations have served as a tool of recruitment. After the modest performance of the party in , when there were only 5, core cadres and 42, cadres in total, its leadership set the target of expanding to , total cadres by The hope was that each cadre would attract five to ten new voters per-week prior to the election.
See, Matta, Integrasi Politik, , p. The Indonesian Case. Rather than approach a stranger, this mechanism begins by persuading potential recruits among families, friends, and neighbours. In other words, PKS recruitment is built on preexisting relationships while at the same time enhancing a new kind of solidarity based on shared beliefs, strong commitment and loyalty. There are various institutional forms of outreach involving PKS organisational structures, PKS-affiliated organisations as well as benefiting from religious institutions i.
It decided to engage with the governing coalition led by President Yudhoyono, and had three of its nominees in the thirty-four member cabinet. Above all, the aforementioned forms of cadre recruitment in PKS can be divided into two categories in terms of political objectives.
The second is aimed at enlisting potential cadres in selective ways. Having proclaimed itself to be a cadre party which sets strict standards of recruitment, PKS requires its cadres to rise through a series of intensive trainings. As noted earlier, PKS members are trained through a series of six levels ending with takhssus, holders of special expertise in dakwah.
Muayyid Those who completed TD 1 and have been These cadres are Cadres recommended by their murabbi instructor recorded in the Young to be Muayyid Cadres. Muntasib Cadres in this level are attending training These cadres are Cadres and religious circles as the muayyid, but enlisted at the Medium the content and intensity of trainings are district level more advanced. Provincial level Their murabbi have a right to recommend branches DPW them to rise to the next level.
Amil Cadres These cadres have completed all required These cadres are Specialist trainings and are attending the training at documented and the specialist level. These cadres have the registered by the right to hold high and strategic positions in Central Executive the party.
Board DPP Takhassus This is the highest level of trainings These cadres are Cadres holding special expertise in dakwah, registered by the Post completing the ahli trainings.
They are eligible to be tan are not required to pass through these honourary cadres. As can be seen in figure 6, the four highest levels, i. In addition, they have the right to hold strategic positions in the national leadership of PKS. The enjoyment of being a party cadre will not exist without loyalty, the enjoyment of loyalty will not exist without obedience, the enjoyment of obedience will not exist without sacrifice, and the enjoyment of sacrifice will not exist without sincerity keikhlasan.
In addition to being the only cadre party in Indonesia, PKS members are also different in terms of their demographic backgrounds. PKS has attracted many talented Muslims in the country. They are usually young and better educated than other political party members. Some of them have advanced degrees from foreign 75 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, , p. This excerpt is not my translation. PKS has also particularly found acceptance in urban areas.
Most of their qualifications are in the medical and natural sciences. It comes as no surprise then that PKS members seem to be technologically savvy, often communicating and disseminating their views on audiocassettes, videotapes, email and web pages. In Indonesia where people smoke everywhere, it is almost impossible to find a cadre of the party who smokes.
PKS cadres strive to follow closely Islamic norms and practices by appearing strictly Islamic in terms of wearing Islamic attire and eating halal food lawful food according to Islamic beliefs. In a country where most women do not cover their heads, it is difficult to find a female PKS cadre without a jilbab veil.
Meanwhile its male members usually wear baju koko. In connection with the halal issue, PKS members would prefer to take the option of eating food with label halal on it and scrutinising the ingredients. As a social movement which actively mobilises its supporters onto the streets, PKS faces financial challenges to meet the needs of transporting its protesters to the site of demonstrations, producing leaflets, logistics, and the like. Similarly, as a newly established party, PKS is experiencing a heavy financial burden due to its lack of business networks while at the same time it must cover the routine costs of political party activity such as an increase in the operational expenses, expenditures for electoral campaigning and constituency mobilisation and the like.
Members of the party are obliged to pay religious dues, zakat alms , infaq gift for specific purposes , and shadaqah charitable gifts. Basic questions about how these arrangements are carried out and how much money is collected from these internal donations remain unanswered. First, PKS instructs its cadres who hold parliamentary seats in national, provincial, and district levels to pay contributions to the party.
In practice, however, PKS has drawn criticism. The most controversial of these was the nomination of Tamsil Linrung as the PKS legislative candidate, despite his bad reputation for financial mismanagement.
This clearly indicates that, as a new party, PKS is still struggling to expand its business networks and access to wealthy entrepreneurs.
In Indonesian politics, in fact, entrepreneurs and large corporations make up important sources of income for most parties. Hidayat and Zulkieflimansyah admitted that such financial constraints hinder the party from making visits throughout the entire country to spread its message. Notable among these was the former deputy chief of the national police, Gen.
Adang Daradjatun, who was widely speculated to have paid considerable contributions to the party in exchange for his nomination as a governor of Jakarta. More significantly, these dubious fund-raising efforts have raised further questions about PKS integrity.
Nonetheless, the current government issued a new decree, that is, the Government Regulation 29 of stating that the per-vote based formula would be replaced by a seat-based one.
According to the new decree, political parties were to receive annually Rp 21 million per-seat obtained in the elections, with local authorities to issue their own regulations. This new funding formula resulted in a significant decrease in income for any political party.
If the government uses the old funding scheme, PKS central office would receive Rp. To some extent, PKS has, more so than other mass parties, mostly funded its activities through membership fees and small contributions made by its cadres. The model of an internal funding mechanism can reduce the dependence of PKS on state subsidies on the one hand and external contributions made by politically interested donors on the other.
Media as Communication Networks As noted earlier, the ideological outreach of PKS and its recruitment channels are typically personal and based on preexisting social relationships. But such relationships have been reinforced by other electronic and printed media as 99 For further discussion on the mass parties, see Richard Katz, Democracy and Elections, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Among other things, the weekly news magazine Sabili is the most popular Islamist publication, the circulation of which in was more than one hundred thousand per-issue.
Saksi is the news magazine whose primary sections are national political issues, international news, especially from the Muslim world, and columns and opinions provided by PKS intellectuals and affiliates.
Meanwhile, Annida is a less politically interested magazine targeting young Muslims whose rubric is mostly dominated by Islamic short stories. However, on some occasions, Annida appeals to its readers to help Palestinians perceived as suffering from the Israeli occupation. Likewise, Tarbawi offers less political news. The magazine often reports on social work and activities carried out by PKS as well as featuring the personal sides of PKS leading figures.
According to Rijal, there are numerous indications showing the issues and views raised by such Islamic magazines are concomitant with the characteristics of Tarbiyah. PKS central office and its branches, ranging from the provincial level to the village level, promote their political views and religious values through more than 50 websites.
Also, PKS special branches overseas utilise websites and mailing lists to reinforce their networks. PKS was formed by activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah which seized the momentum of the downfall of Suharto regime. Nonetheless, the collapse of the regime created opportunities for Tarbiyah to form PKS and thus utilising a far more visible institution and network.
Since the post- Suharto era, PKS has also endeavoured to boast its resource mobilisation, including acquisition of income, cadre recruitment, organisational and networking expansion, so that the party can actively engage with collective action and thus requires no jump start at election time.
However, the development of the Tarbiyah movement that led to the emergence of PKS cannot only be treated in organisational and political terms, but also in a way to link shared ideas, meaning and beliefs with political and organisational factors. In social movement theory, the study of ideas and the social construction of ideas has come to be known as collective action frames.
Many proponents of collective action frames indicate the strong relations between frames and the role of ideology in mobilising collective action. In this way, PKS has successfully proven its ability to produce clear summations of its ideology that resonate with its target audience.
In this chapter, I will concentrate on PKS framing processes and dynamics. Key Elements of Collective Action Frames Social movement scholars use the concept of collective action frames to define a problem in collective terms that necessitates a collective response. At this point, students of social movements refer to Klandermans coined consensus and action mobilisation by which the support or the erosion of support for participation is influenced by attitudinal and behavioral aspects.
Benford and David A. The second is prognostic framing that entails the articulation of a proposed solution to the problems and the identification of strategies, tactics and targets.
A crucial component of PKS diagnostic frames is to blame the spread of Western liberal beliefs and practices for a broad range of problems including moral decay, economic injustice and political degradation. More specifically, PKS activists point to what they perceive to be the root of Western values, that is, secularism, as it manifests itself in various spheres of life. They regard this as the greatest challenge ever to the Muslim community and Islamic values.
Those serious efforts failed because of the strong opposition from the secular-nationalist-Christian political parties. For a detailed account of the Jakarta Charter, see B. Terwujudnya Masyarakat Madani yang Adil, Sejahtera dan Bermartabat, no publisher, no place, no date , p. By contrast, Hizbut Tahrir is heavily involved in political matters campaigning for Islam as the only solution for the current human-made system i.
Instead, PKS appears to frame Islam as both the solution both for the transformation of individuals and for the so-called Islamising of the state through formal political participation.
The party offers two patterns of Islamisation. Islam must be understood as kaffah, a total, comprehensive and all-encompassing way of life with no separation between al-diin wa al-dawlah religion and state. In other words, PKS views Islam as a comprehensive corpus of rules and guidelines that provides all the spiritual and worldly needs of human beings syamil.
Such universality of Islam will provide a moral basis for the development of Indonesia. Cultural Islamisation, carried out in gradual and incremental ways, is a long process. If the substance sufficiently represents the name [i. Previously, the people ran this nation in a secular way [but] now we want run it Islamically. That is the essence of it. Having said that PKS has attempted to address individual and structural changes, the party draws on the existing concept of dakwah, but adapts it for new purposes.
Second, PKS introduced new content into the material of dakwah with emphasis on the interpretation of Islam as more than a code governing moral conduct; instead it is a total way of life which provides guidance for the transformation of individual beliefs and for the organisation of society and state.
In the case of PKS, this reward manifests into two ways: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes: Doug McAdam, John D. Zald, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, , p. Abu Ridha, ideologue and PKS leading figure wrote: For an Islamic party, Islamic ideology is the foundation of all structures of its actions and, at the same time, [it works] as the axis of its political moves.
In this context, the department [of] cadreisation is responsible to implant Islamic ideology among all cadres so that their political mind-set unequivocally is based on ideology. The two are an extension of the dakwah arena where cadres are encouraged to struggle in constitutional ways for the application of Islamic norms through state policies and legislation. Those PKS stages of dakwah are carried out gradually, starting from the bottom up.
Not my translation. As the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, put it: When society itself has become truly Islamic, it will be only a matter of time before Islam is extended to the sphere of the state.
Electoral Strategy and Non-Islamist Agenda As a political party seeking to extend support beyond its traditional basis outside pious Muslim middle-class and educated people, PKS faces a major challenge of how to appeal to wider society. That is why PKS downplayed Islamist issues in the elections and shied away from showing its Islamist stance too plainly.
This electoral strategy was successful in where PKS increased of its share of the vote to 7. Since then, PKS has prioritised to building its reputation for incorruptibility. It has opposed several plans to increase salaries for legislators and has pledged to refuse bribes.
Recently, the PKS faction in DPR reported the gratification funds its members received and returned the money to the Corruption Eradication Commission in an attempt to promote clean government. To be fair, PKS is not entirely free of corruption allegations.
It was attacked for its choice of Suripto as a legislative candidate despite the fact that he was under investigation for corruption. It has also been widely speculated that PKS sold nominations for executive office, most notably, the former deputy chief of the national police Adang Daradjatun who reportedly paid a large amount of money to the party in exchange for his nomination as a governor of Jakarta. However, relative to other parties, PKS is far more committed to the ideals of clean government and has consistently taken an uncompromising stance in the fight against corruption.
Along with fourteen other Indonesian Islamic organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah called every Muslim to perform jihad fight against corruption.
Also, the agenda of eradicating corruption in Indonesia, which is a problem deeply rooted both at the both the local and national level is attractive for Indonesian people in general regardless of their religion and background. This is particularly the case for PKS whose rhetoric of clean government is backed up by its visible and steadfast position against corruption.
It is clear that the party has adopted what Liddle and Mujani called a two-track—simultaneously Islamist and non-Islamist— electoral strategy. In addition, there are also growing signs that local campaigns which involve PKS cadres in many provinces and districts in Aceh, West Sumatra, West Java, Banten, and South Sulawesi pushing for laws based on Islamic norms such as regulating Islamic attire in public office, banning alcohol, gambling, and prostitution.
In many instances, PKS has continuously tried to burnish its image as an open party committed to pluralism and tolerance. However, this self-proclamation is clearly at odds with PKS training documents indicating widespread intolerant interpretations of Islam among many of its leaders and cadres. The institute has conducted a nationwide survey through face-to- face interviews with 1, respondents as a sample selected through multistage random sampling.
This method is used to produce a sample that enables us to make inferences and generalisations about the national population. It recorded that a number of factors correlate positively with support for Islamist agendas, most notably support for PKS compared to support for PDI-P and other large parties.
These Islamist issues range from moral reform to transnational Islamism. For more detailed information of this measurement, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia, Support for Religious Radical Attitudes and Behaviour, , available at http: I have also noted that PKS remains preoccupied by distant but religiously charged issues Chapter 3. In the following pages, I will present three of the major Islamist transnational frames employed by PKS.
The first is that Islam is under siege by the West. The second is there is a Jewish conspiracy to undermine Islam. The third, replicating one of most common frames among Islamist movements elsewhere, is the idea of the global umma as the parameter of the Muslim identity.
Also, these cultural framings show the ability of PKS to link its ideology with a more specific interpretation of a situation. It also suggests that PKS founders who formulated the vision and mission of the party were driven by a strong sense of global Muslim subjugation and suppression. The invocation of an Islamic golden age is especially prevalent in the thinking of Muslims whose outlook is shaped by a deep reverence for history.
The second phase is the decline of Muslim power in the late seventeenth century exemplified by loss of territory and the period of Western colonialism. Again, this is not a unique of PKS view. Virtually everywhere in the contemporary Muslim world, Islamists have felt subordinate to the West.
It holds: The condition of Muslims today is…pitiful and under the rule of the enemies of Islam. Muslims as the best and grand community obviously no longer display their grandness amidst other humankind; even appears to wane more and more because of ignorance [jahiliyyah]…Muslims today have deficiencies such as ethics, training, culture …organisational management [and] intellect.
This situation exists in a majority of Islamic countries. There is only one simple solution: This concept is frequently used by PKS to counter what is perceived as Western ideological challenges to Muslim worldviews. It holds that there is a fundamental division of the world into two categories: Islamic and non-Islamic or jahiliyyah.
Nonetheless, Sayyid Qutb and modern Islamists expanded the meaning to a set of un-Islamic cultures in Muslim societies. The infidels…have since looked for an alternative way of destroying the Islamic community…The strategy they have chosen to destroy Islam is al- ghazw al-fikri. Al-ghazw al-fikri is an ideological, cultural, mental and conceptual attack waged continually in a systematic, organised and well- planned fashion. The result is the emergence of a change in the personality, lifestyle and behaviour of the Muslim community…These efforts…began with the severing of ties between Islamic countries under the Islamic caliphate, causing the emergence of nationalist groups and national ideologies.
In many PKS training documents, Jews and Zionists are conflated leading to a tendency to see the Palestine-Israeli conflict in fundamentally religious, not nationalist, terms. Furthermore, PKS propagates the view of Jewish control over the world. The Jews aspire to control the world by conquering every system owned by each nation or nation. Whatever method the Jews may employ through their Zionist movement, their aim is always to control the world.
This urge to control the world is founded on a conviction that God has appointed Jews as the leaders of nations and the heirs of the earth and all that is legitimate in it. Islam holds the same conviction, called a caliphate, namely that a faithful and pious organ has been given a mandate to develop and tend the earth and all that is in it.
This conviction on the part of Muslims will motivate Jews to wage war on Islam, because Islam has the potential to defeat the Jews. I cite from Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker eds. The Jews are widely known to have orchestrated various secret movements. They have also been behind many catastrophes throughout history. The Jews control world or foreign politics through effective way to conquer the world, which they follow, is by economic means. History also shows that the Jews defeat other people through their economic strength, namely through a system of bank interest and control of assets using unjust and dishonest trade practices.
Global Umma PKS uses the rhetoric of returning society to genuine Islamic identity by utilising the concept of umma and Muslim brotherhood, above notions of race, blood, clan, tribe, nation, and birth place. Accordingly, the party shares a greater sense of Islamic unity and solidarity and views Muslims in different parts of the world within the framework of a global Muslim umma than do other Indonesian Islamist parties. I cite from Fealy and Hooker eds.
This, indeed, has been the very nature of the dakwah. It is an activity that is not limited to certain ethnics, or by state or regional boundaries. This recognition highlights that the existence of our dakwah is part of the dakwah activities around the globe. It is, therefore, essential that every policy made, program planned and step taken is in harmony with the international dakwah strategy and follows the sunnat al-dakwah whilst not setting aside specific issues happening locally.
In the national congress of PK when the party deliberated over policy guidelines it was revealed that the Islamic caliphate is seen as its long-term orientation. Hence, every policy…and program…connects [to] three time dimensions. The past as lesson, the present as reality and the future as hope. Nonetheless, the notion of global umma is still strong in the minds of PKS leaders.
Among Islamist groups, Hibut Tahrir is the most vocal group and widely propagates the necessity of restoring a single and universal caliphate for all Muslims across the world. PKS also shares this idea, but there are important differences in strategies for rebuilding the caliphate. In contrast to Hizbut Tahrir which aims to resurrect the caliphate by rejecting the concepts of nation-state and democracy, critics within PKS consider this method to be unrealistic.
To PKS, the Islamic caliphate could be realised through a gradualist approach which has strong strategic value. While Hizbut Tahrir views the Islamic global caliphate as the necessary condition, PKS saw it as an outcome of the unity of the Muslim world. We 69 Andi Rakhmat, Interview, 27 August PKS is now striving to achieve the integration of umma. A key leader of the party, Untung Wahono, holds: We are bonded together by no other quality than the fact of being Muslim.
When Palestinians are suffering from Israeli brutal attacks, Indonesian Muslims should express their Islamic solidarity beyond geographical boundaries. PKS replicates the most common frame among Islamist groups in the Middle East, that is, the notion of Islam as the solution al-Islam huwa al-haal. The vulnerability of the Muslim world and social ills of the society are attributed to the departure from Islamic values.
Available at: The party successfully increased its vote by six hundred percent, from 1. Despite its success PKS is an unusual party in many respects, most notable is that it is not merely a political party that articulates its agenda within institutionalised politics, but it also acts as a social movement organisation which vigorously engages in collective action. It regularly uses collective action as a vehicle to continuously engage with its supporters—rather than only reaching out at election time as is the case with most other parties.
No other party is so active in regularly mobilising their sympathisers on the streets. As described in Chapter 2, PKS takes this form as a political party partly because it emerged out of an Islamist student movement called Tarbiyah. Following the resignation of Suharto in , Tarbiyah activists seized the momentum by transforming their movement into a political party named PK, now known as PKS.
Having this general picture in mind, I felt that it was pertinent to ask: In answering this question, I used a social movement integrated approach, combining three emerging trends in the tradition of social movement research, i. From these three integrated perspectives, I demonstrated that PKS: The first factor of the emergence of PKS was a significant increase in political opportunity structure. Based on evidence gathered in this research, it is clear that the development of Tarbiyah leading to the formation of PKS did not occur in a vacuum.
Instead, the party relied on external conditions that provided a mechanism for collective action. These international contexts of political opportunities helped to structure the domestic possibilities for the development of Tarbiyah on which PKS was based.
Indeed dakwah activities faced no problems during the New Order era as long as they were not political. Accordingly, Tarbiyah focused its activities on the cultivation of religious understanding and practices among Islamic students in secular universities.
This approach is based on a theoretical assumption that political opportunities alone do not make a movement. As described in Chapter 5, the rise of Tarbiyah and PKS can be explained through its capacity to improve its organisational strength, including building a system cadre, leadership, communication networks and financial assets. In addition, the establishment of LDK as one of student dakwah networks across campuses is also important for managing a range of religious activities organised by Tarbiyah activists.
By the mids, Tarbiyah activists began to take control of student senates in many prestigious universities along with their success in establishing the student movement group, KAMMI.
Utilising preexisting Tarbiyah networks, the party expanded its organisational structures rapidly throughout Indonesia. The last factor shaping the emergence of Tarbiyah and PKS was the formation of collective action frames. Frames identify targets of blame, offer solutions to achieve a desirable world, and provide a rationale to motivate collective action.
Frames can draw upon ideology. Accordingly, PKS activists attribute many of the problems besetting the global Muslim community to the spread of secularism. Furthermore, PKS leaders have endeavoured to frame their position on these non-Islamist issues in religious terms.
Aside from striving to implement Islamic-based laws through formal politics, PKS also uses collective action to maintain its Islamic image. The results of this study suggest that roughly six-in-ten of PKS demonstrations can be called Islamist in essence. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously charged issues rather than grappling with non-Islamist and domestic issues that correspond with national interests.
It can be argued that PKS is still preoccupied with Islamist transnational framings. Also, these framings demonstrated the ability of PKS to construct its ideology and discourse with the objective of mobilising support. Tahap demi tahap perjuangan panjang mengantarkan bangsa ini ke gerbang kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan, yang pada mulanya dicitakan untuk mewujudkan Negara yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial, sesuai dengan semangat Proklamasi Namun selama lima dekade berikutnya, garis sejarah itu mengalami berbagai penyimpangan, sehingga cita-cita besar bangsa menjadi kabur.
Kejatuhan rejim Orde Lama, diikuti dengan keruntuhan rejim Orde Baru, merupakan tragedi yang seharusnya menyadarkan kembali bangsa ini akan cita- cita luhurnya semula.
Seluruh kekuatan bangsa wajib bergandeng tangan dengan landasan persaudaraan, keadilan, dan berpacu dalam kebaikan, seraya meninggalkan permusuhan, kedhaliman, dan pertikaian antar kelompok.
Gerakan mahasiswa, yang disokong penuh rakyat Indonesia, telah mengobarkan "Reformasi Mei " sebagai peretas jalan bagi terbentuknya "Orde Reformasi";orde yang diikat dengan nilai-nilai fitri kemanusiaan berupa keimanan, moralitas, kemerdekaan, persamaan, kedamaian, dan keadilan. Berkat rahmat Allah SWT, kemudian dipicu semangat reformasi, tercetuslah momentum untuk membangun kembali negeri yang besar ini, dengan cara pandang yang benar dan meninggalkan segala bentuk kesalahan generasi terdahulu.
Mari bersatu dalam kebenaran untuk mengisi lembaran sejarah baru agar bangsa Indonesia senantiasa berdiri tegak dan berperan serta dalam mewujudkan masyarakat international yang berperadaban. Kejayaan atau kehancuran suatu negeri merupakan buah dari kepatuhan atau keingkaran penduduknya terhadap nilai-nilai religius dan universal, terutama nilai keadilan. Pada titik ini fitrah insani bertemu dengan tuntutan reformasi dan peluang demokratisasi.
Semoga Allah Yang Maha Kuasa membimbing dan memberi kekuatan untuk menegakkan keadilan, mewujudkan kesejahteraan dan kemakmuran bagi seluruh bangsa Indonesia. Berbuat adillah, karena adil itu lebih dekat kepada taqwa Hidayat Nurwahid, M. Ketua Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, M.
Sekretaris Anggota Dr. Salim Segaf Aljufri, M. Mulyanto, M. Nur Mahmudi Isma'il, M. Abu Ridho, A. Mutammimul Ula, S. Abdul Hasib, Lc. Fahri Hamzah, S. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, M. Agus Nurhadi Igo Ilham, Ak. Chin Kun Min al-Hafizh Drs. Arifinto Nursanita Nasution, S. Rahmat Abdullah Dr. Ahmad Satori Ismail Ir. Untung Wahono Ir. Suswono Mashadi Dra. Sri Utami Nurmansyah Lubis, S.
Naharus Surur Drs. Muhroni Drs. Suharna S. Ihsan Arlansyah Tanjung H. Aus Hidayat Ir. Tifatul Sembiring Drs. Al Muzammil Yusuf Drs. Mukhlis Abdi Maddu Mallu, S. Nasir Zein, M. Acep Abdus Syakur Dr. Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, M.
Yusuf Supendi, Lc. Yoyoh Yusroh M. Anis Matta, Lc. Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc. Zirlirosa Jamil Syamsul Balda, S. Ahmad Heriawan, Lc. Erlangga Masdiana, M. Didik Akhmadi, Ak. Abdur Roqib, Lc. Abdullah Said Baharmus, Lc. Ahmad Hatta, M. Makmur Hasanuddin, M. Setelah lepas dari penjajahan Belanda dan Jepang selama tiga setengah abad, Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya pada tanggal 17 Agustus Kebangkitan ini berjalan hingga tahun ketika upaya untuk membangun bangsa yang demokratis dan sejahtera mengalami kebuntuan dengan dikeluarkannya Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli yang menandai awal diktaktorisme di Indonesia.
Orde Baru muncul pada tahun tetapi ternyata hanya merupakan sebuah perpanjangan tangan kekuasaan militer yang benih-benihnya sudah mulai bersemi pada masa Orde Lama. Pada tanggal 21 Mei bangsa Indonesia mengukir kembali harapannya untuk hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi harapan ke depan dengan digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh perjuangan mahasiswa dan rakyat. Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan kesejahteraan bagi bangsa Indonesia dari perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad.
Demokratisasi menjadi tulang punggung perjuangan tersebut yang mewadahi partisipasi masyarakat dalam keseluruhan aspeknya. Bertolak dari kesadaran tersebut, dibentuklah sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah untuk mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum muslimin khususnya beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia umumnya.
Partai tersebut bernama Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. Semoga Allah SWT memberikan hidayah dan inayah-Nya kepada kita, mengikatkan hati diantara para pengikut agama-Nya dan menolong perjuangan mereka dimana pun mereka berada. Almuzzammil Yusuf Ketua Drs. Ahmadi Sukarno, Lc. M Ridwan H. Edy Kuncoro, SE. Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan Sejahtera bagi bangsa Indonesia dari perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad.
Bertolak dari kesadaran tersebut, dibentuk sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah untuk mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum muslimin beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia, dengan Anggaran Dasar sebagai berikut. Pasal 2 Asas Islam. Pasal 3 Kedudukan 1. Pusat Partai berkedudukan di ibu kota negara Republik Indonesia.
Pusat partai dapat dipindahkan dalam kondisi tertentu atas keputusan Majelis Syuro. Partai dapat membuka cabang-cabang di seluruh wilayah hukum negara Republik Indonesia dan perwakilan di luar negeri bagi Warga Negara Indonesia. Membebaskan bangsa Indonesia dari segala bentuk kezaliman. Membina masyarakat Indonesia menjadi masyarakat Islami. Mempersiapkan bangsa Indonesia agar mampu menjawab berbagai problema dan tuntutan masa mendatang.
Membangun sistem kehidupan bermasyarakat dan bernegara yang sesuai dengan nilai-nilai Islam. Membangun negara Indonesia baru yang adil, sejahtera dan berwibawa. Majelis Syuro 2. Majelis Pertimbangan Partai. Dewan Syari'ah Pusat 4. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 5. Telah selesai menjalani masa jabatannya sesuai dengan masa kerja yang telah ditetapkan.
Apabila tidak dapat lagi melaksanakan kewajiban-kewajibannya sebagai Pimpinan Partai , maka Majelis Syuro hendaknya mempelajari kondisi tersebut dan mengambil keputusan yang sesuai. Jika terlihat bahwa penghentian Pimpinan Partai tersebut akan membawa maslahat bagi Partai, maka hendaknya Majelis Syuro mengadakan pertemuan khusus untuk itu.
Dan keputusan penghentian Pimpinan partai tersebut harus mendapatkan persetujuan lebih dari dua pertiga anggota Majelis Syuro. Apabila ada Pimpinan Partai mengajukan pengunduran dirinya, maka Majelis Syuro hendaklah mengundang anggotanya untuk mempelajari latar belakang pengunduran diri tersebut dan mengambil keputusan yang sesuai. Dan apabila yang bersangkutan mendesak mengundurkan diri maka pengunduran diri itu dapat diterima berdasarkan keputusan suara terbanyak secara mutlak anggota Majelis Syuro.
Apabila terjadi kevakuman pada jabatan ketua dan wakil ketua Majelis Syuro dalam waktu yang sama, maka Majelis Syuro melakukan pemilihan penggantinya. Apabila Ketua Dewan syari'ah Pusat meninggal dunia, maka wakilnya mengambil alih seluruh wewenangnya hingga habis masa jabatannya.
Anggota Majelis Syuro terdiri dari sekurang-kurangnya tiga puluh lima orang yang dipilih melalui pemilihan raya yang melibatkan seluruh anggota kader inti partai. Pemilihan anggota Majelis Syuro dilakukan melalui pemilihaan raya yang penyelenggaraannya dengan membentuk kepanitiaan oleh Majelis Syuro yang sekurang-kurangnya terdiri dari: Pengesahan dan pelantikan anggota Majelis Syuro terpilih dilakukan oleh Musyawarah Nasional. Pasal 13 Tugas Majelis Syuro 1. Majelis Syuro bertugas menyusun Visi dan Missi Partai, ketetapan- ketetapan dan rekomendasi Musyawarah Nasional, dan memilih Pimpinan Pusat Partai serta keputusan-keputusan strategis lainnya.
Dewan Syari'ah diberi wewenang membentuk struktur kepengurusan, mengangkat Mudir Idarah dan melengkapi keanggotaannya. Jumlah anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah sekurang-kurangnya tiga orang.
Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah diberi wewenang melengkapi keanggotaannya dan mengangkat Mudir Idarah. Pasal 17 Tugas Dewan Syari'ah Dewan Syari'ah adalah lembaga fatwa dan qadha yang bertugas merumuskan landasan syar'i terhadap partai dalam melaksanakan aktifitasnya dan memberikan jawaban syar'i terhadap berbagai permasalahan yang dihadapi partai dan anggotanya serta masyarakat. Ketua Umum 2. Sekretaris Jendral. Bendahara Umum. Departemen-departemen yang diperlukan. Pasal 19 Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat adalah lembaga tanfiziyah partai pada tingkat pusat yang bertugas melaksanakan kegiatan-kegiatan partai dengan masa kerja selama lima 5 tahun qomariyah. Organisasi Wilayah didirikan pada tingkat propinsi yang berkedudukan di ibukota propinsi. Besarnya lembaga atau badan-badan tersebut disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan wilayah.
Dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat Daerah didirikan organaisasi cabang dan dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat cabang pada tingkat kecamatan didirikan organisasi Ranting. Struktur organisasi yang disebutkan ayat 1 dan 2 pasal ini disusun sesuai dengan Anggaran Rumah Tangga. Musyawarah adalah forum pengambilan kebijakan yang diselenggarakan oleh semua elemen struktural Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.
Jenis dan jenjang musyawarah diatur dengan ketentuan tersendiri yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro. Iuran rutin anggota.
Sumbangan dan hibah dari para anggota dan simpatisan 3. Sumber-sumber lain yang halal dan tidak mengikat. Ummat Islam Indonesia merupakan bagian dari ummat Islam sedunia. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera sebagai Partai Da'wah menyatakan dirinya merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan dari gerakan da'wah di berbagai kawasan dunia.
Untuk merealisasikan kemaslahatan ummat dan bangsa, Partai melakukan hubungan baik dan kerjasama dengan berbagai pihak di dalam maupun di luar negeri. Majelis Syuro adalah lembaga yang berwenang memutuskan koalisi partai dengan partai atau organisasi lain. Pasal 26 Hubungan Antar Struktur Hubungan antar lembaga-lembaga partai tingkat pusat dan lembaga-lembaga partai tingkat pusat dengan lembaga-lembaga di bawahnya diatur dalam Anggaran Rumah Tangga. Permintaan perubahan berikut alasan-alasannya diajukan melalui mekanisme struktural kepada Majelis Syuro untuk dinilai kelayakannya.
Pengubahan dianggap sah bila disetujui oleh dua pertiga anggota Majelis Syuro.