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Skip to main content. Log In Sign Up. I Gede Dana Santika. This summary is made in order to fulfill the final semester task of Philosophy of Science in the third semester of Physics Education Department, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Science, Ganesha Univesity of Education. In the preparation of this summary, the writer received support from other parties. Therefore, the writers do not forget to express appreciation and thanks to: I Wayan Suastra, M. Other parties that cannot be mentioned one by one that has been providing assistance in completing this paper. The authors realize that this summary is far from what people says perfect because the ability of author is still lacking. Therefore, the authors expect criticism and suggestions from various parties to the perfection of this summary. And hopefully this summary can be useful for all of us. The Writer. In the preface, Kuhn tells us that he began the work as a way of explaining to himself and his friends why he chose to study the history of science.

We are also conscious that it would probably be impossible to construct a watertight, uncontested definition that would clearly divide theory from non-theory. On this basis we will count something as a contri- bution to IR theory if it meets at least one of the following conditions: IR theory is mainly the prov- ince of academics, but we will not exclude the thinking of practitioners if it meets, or leans towards, our criteria. IR is a big subject without fixed borders. It has many frontiers where it blends into history, economics, sociology, domestic politics, psychology, law and military strategy.

In keeping with this character, we will take a broadminded view not just of what theory is, but what it theorizes about. Western dominance of IR theory There are two obvious, and partly reciprocal, ways in which the Western domin- ance of IRT manifests itself. The second is the Eurocentric framing of world history, which weaves through and around much of this theory.

Since the bald fact of Western dominance is not controversial there is no need to demonstrate this in great detail. But a brief sketch of the main branches of IRT in this light gives a sense of the nature and sources of Eurocentrism that might well prove useful in setting up comparisons with non-Western thinking about IR.

Classical realism, with its focus on state sovereignty, military power and national interest is rooted in the diplomatic and political practices of modern Europe up to This, in turn, supports a foreign policy prescription based on self-interest, self-reliance, suspicion, vigilance and prudence.

Neorealism differs mainly by placing the source of power politics in the survival needs of states embedded in anarchic international system structures. Both classical and neorealism project onto the rest of world history their basic Europe-derived story of international anarchy and balance of power politics as a permanent, universal structural condition.

Because of its commitment to anarchic structure and balance of power politics, realism largely ignores the great swathes of history, both Western Rome and non-Western, where empires such as the Han, the Persian, the Inca and the Aztec held sway over their known worlds.

Its main historical story is the modern one in which Western powers both fight amongst themselves and take over the rest of the world, though that said, realism unhesitatingly makes room for any state, Western or not, that qualifies as a great power. Japan thus climbs into the realist frame from the late nineteenth century, and China began to do so after the communists took power.

Realism has played a major role in defining the mainstream subject matter of IR in state-centric terms. In that sense, it has been an accomplice to Western hegemony by taking the political system that the West imposed on the rest of the world, and declaring it the norm for all of world history.

Strategic Studies is closely linked to realism, generally accepting the realist inter- pretation of how the world is, and focusing within that on the technical, tactical and strategic aspects of military power and its uses.

Strategic Studies is rooted in the tradition of the Western way in warfare and its classics: Clausewitz Napoleonic wars , Mahan British naval practice and strategy and a host of responses to developments in Western military technology tanks, aircraft, nuclear weapons etc.

During the Cold War, Strategic Studies flourished in the pursuit of deterrence theory as a response to the co-development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. In this pursuit it was much influenced by rational choice modes of analysis drawn from Western economic thinking. But here at least there was some non-Western input with Mao Zedong and Che Guevara acquiring status as writers on guerrilla war, and Sun Tzu on strategic thinking.

Like realism, the tendency of Strategic Studies to privilege the West is historically contingent rather than built in. Liberalism and neoliberalism have clear roots in European political and economic theory Cobden, Hobson, Kant, Locke, Smith , and in the Western practice of polit- ical economy from the nineteenth century onwards.

Buzan of Western thinking and practice, yet are presented as universal truths that are applicable to, and whose application would be beneficial to, all human beings. The general policy prescription of liberalism is the need to homogenize along liberal lines economic and political practices and human rights across the planet.

Whereas realism reflects a backward-looking assessment of the European experi- ence how things were and always will be , liberalism reflects a forward-looking one: Justification for this frankly imperial perspective is found in the great relative success of the West in terms of power and prosperity and justice compared with the rest of the world during the past two centuries.

As an offshoot of liberalism, the successful development of formal theory within Western economics has provided considerable support to those who want to apply the methodology of the natural sciences to the social world. This has manifested itself in the emergence of behaviouralism, the development of neorealism and the application of rational choice theory to a wide range of social phenomena. While real- ism tends to relegate the economic sector to being an element of state power, the natural tendency of economic liberalism is to separate the economic and political spheres, treating the former as a separate domain amenable to scientific analysis, and the latter as a residual that will largely be taken care of if the economy is run on sound liberal principles.

International political economy IPE struggles against both these tendencies, rejecting the idea that the economic and political sectors can be seen as autonomous, and seeing them instead as strongly interlinked. Instead of using individualism and the market to unleash the power of capital into an evermore prosperous future, Marxism sees the liberal formula as profoundly unstable and leading inevitably to class war. Marxism is the opposite of liberalism in preferring collectivism to individualism and a command economy to a market one.

But like liberalism, Marxism rejects the past and looks forward to a better future, and also sees its own prescription as universally valid. While the Soviet Union was in business, Marxists could use it to justify their claim to the future.

But once the Soviet Union failed, and China kept the name, but not much of the substance, of communism, Marxism lost much of its standing as a model for the future of industrial society. The English School, has its roots in much of the same Western political theory as realism Hobbes, Machiavelli and liberalism Kant , albeit with more prominence given to Grotius and the idea that states can and should form among themselves an international society.

The main models for this are found in European history, both classical Greece and modern Europe, though some work has also been done to show the existence of international societies in premodern, non-Western con- texts. Through the success of its imperialism, Europe remade the world politically in its own image of sovereign territorial states, diplomacy and international law.

The English School has been much preoccupied with the con- sequences of expanding a culturally coherent European international society to a global scale that lacks a strong common culture to underpin it. It has told well the stories of how China, Japan, the Ottoman Empire and some other non-Western countries encountered European international society. The concept of international society could in principle be applied to non-Western histories, but only a little work has been done in this direction.

Historical Sociology is perhaps on the borders of IRT. It has links to Marx, Weber and other classical Western sociological thinkers. Although some parts of its lit- erature have taken on broad world-historical themes, notably Wallerstein Mann and Hobson , the main focus of this literature is on the making of the Westphalian state, and thus, like the English School, it puts European history on centre stage. Some elements of historical sociology, most notably Tilly cut close to realism in their linkage of the state and war.

Critical theory has roots in Marxism, specifically the idea that the point is not just to understand the world but to change it, and in the more contemporary European social theory of Habermas.

Unlike the other progressive IR theories Marxism and liberalism, which offer quite concrete visions of the ideal future, critical theory offers a general commitment against exclusionism and in favour of emancipation. Like other progressive theories it is universalist, but unlike them and more in common with historical sociology it seeks to understand each situation in its own terms.

In one sense critical theory is an offshoot of the Western tradition of norm- ative theory and the practice of promoting preferred Western values. It can also be seen as a successor to Peace Research. Much, though not all, of feminist writing on IR is found under this heading, with the feminist perspective itself being very strongly rooted in specifically Western political and social practice. Constructivism and postmodernism both have roots in Western philosophy of knowledge and social theory, building particularly on the work of modern European social theorists such as Bordieu and Foucault.

They set themselves up as alternatives to the materialist, positivist epistemologies underpinning realism and liberalism, seeing the social world as needing to be approached in its own terms as an intersubjective realm of shared understandings.

Within that, constructivism is mainly a methodological approach, not carrying any necessary normative content of its own. It ranges across a spectrum from Alexander Wendt, who builds bridges to the neo-neo rationalists, through Emanuel Adler, to Nicholas Onuf and Fritz Kratochwil.

Both constructivists and postmodern- ists see themselves as universalist in application of methods, but as particularist in seeing social structures as being limited in time and space, and so difficult or impossible to compare across time and space.

Most of the rest of feminist writing is found under these headings. This brief survey shows not just the striking variety of Western IRT, but also the great extent to which, despite its frequent universalist pretensions, it is rooted in European history and Western traditions of social theory and practice. A few flecks of non-Western thinking or actors are allowed in at various points, but mainly to validate universalist claims. There is, of course, an important sense in which the ideas within Western IRT are universal.

But looked at in another light, they can also be seen as the particular, parochial and Eurocentric, pretending to be universal in order to enhance their own claims. At the very least this West-centrism sug- gests it is possible for non-Western societies to build understandings of IR based on their own histories and social theories, and even to project these in the form of universalist claims.

Non-Western contributions There are some non-Western contributions that fit broadly within our understand- ing of IRT, though these almost never meet the criteria for hard theory. Instead, they are more likely to fit within softer conceptions, focusing on the ideas and beliefs from classical and contemporary periods.

Broadly, one could identify four major types of work that could be considered as soft theory. What follows is a brief examination of each.

Attempts to derive causal theories out of these do exist, but have been rare. See for example, Modelski ; Hui More important, invoking of the ideas and approaches of these classical writers is seldom devoid of political considerations.

But what may be striking about the invoking of Confucian and Vedic justification for a particular approach to international relations is that they came at a time of growing wealth of power of certain nations: Although a good deal of their thinking may be sourced to training in the West or training in Western texts at home although some, like Sukarno were educated locally , they also came up with ideas and approaches inde- pendent of Western intellectual traditions that were a response to prevailing and changing local and global circumstances.

One concrete example would be the idea of non-alignment, developed by Nehru and fellow Asian and African leaders in the s, which though adapted from concepts of neutralism in the West, was in many respects an independent concept. Nehru also promoted the idea of non-exclusionary regionalism, as opposed to military blocs based on the classic European balance of power model. Like Nehru but focusing on both the security and economic arena, he rejected regional blocs that practice discrimination, such as economic blocs and preferences.

There is some parallel here with the influ- ence of statesmen and generals in Western thinking about IR, foreign policy and strategy: Clausewitz, Bismark, Metternich, Wilson and Lenin, in the case of whom it is hard to separate the intellectual contribution from praxis, and where theory always served immediate policy goals. Unlike the case of these Western practitioners, however, the analysis of the thinking and approach of Asian leaders has been mainly undertaken by biographers and area specialists, rather than scholars specializing in IRT.

Not many scholars, Asian or otherwise, have taken up the challenge of interpreting and developing the writings of Asian leaders from the perspective of IRT. For an important exception, see Bajpai The case of Jawaharlal Nehru is especially interesting and relevant, because Nehru was recognized both within India and in the world, as a thinker in his own right, rather than simply as a political strategist.

Moreover, unlike other political leaders of the day, Nehru did engage Western realist intellectual writings, such as those by Nicholas Spykman and Walter Lippmann.


The fact that such writings and discourses have not found their way into the core literature of IR is revealing. The fact that Nehru was a political leader first and an intellectual second mostly when he was incarcerated by the British cannot be the justification, since IRT has recognized the ideas and approaches of people who were primarily politicians or diplomats, such as Woodrow Wilson, not to men- tion the European master strategists such as Metternich and Castlereagh.

Another example would be Kissinger, although it might be said that Kissinger was a trained academic who became a practitioner, whereas Nehru was a politician who became a theorist. First, they did not see any necessary conflict between nationalism and internationalism. On the contrary, some of these nationalists were among the foremost critics of nationalism as the sole basis for organizing international relations.

This might have been driven partly by a desire to mobilize international support for national liberation. Though a Myanmar patriot and a staunch nationalist, Aung San saw no necessary conflict between nationalism, regionalism and internation- alism.

Some of these nationalists would later adopt a realpolitik approach to foreign policy and security, partly due to the influence of the superpowers as the Cold War set in. The most important aspect of this nascent internationalism of Asia was the advocacy of Asian unity and regional- ism.

Nehru was the most articulate early post-war advocate of Asian unity, which he saw as the inevitable restoration of cultural and commercial links across Asia that had been violently disrupted by colonialism. He organized the Asian Relations Conferences of and , the latter being specifically aimed at creating inter- national pressure on the Dutch to grant independence to Indonesia.

Aung San proclaimed: Outside of classical and modern political ideas about interstate or international relations, a third type of work is non-Westerners who have taken up Western IRT. Many Asian IR scholars have addressed the issue of theory by applying Western theory to local contexts and puzzles and to assess their relevance.

Examples include A. Considering their work as part of the devel- opment of non-Western IRT may be problematic for two reasons, which were identified and extensively debated at the Singapore Workshop. The first relates to the fact that most such scholars have received their training in the West, and have spent a considerable part of their working life in Western institutions.

Buzan Singapore Workshop, with one group holding the view that they should not, while another arguing that the place of training and career-building should be less import- ant than the substance of their contributions in judging whether their work might be regarded as non-Western IRT. As editors, we are inclined to take the latter position.

But then this raises a second issue. What if the work of such scholars simply applies and tests Western concepts and models on Asia to assess their fit? Should this work have the same claim to be an authentic contribution to non-Western IRT com- pared to work, which is much rarer, that makes independent generalizations from the Asian experience that might have transregional or universal applicability. Shea An alternative pathway may be found in a fourth type of work on IRT related to Asia. Such work studies Asian events and experiences and develops concepts that can be used as tools of analysis of more general patterns in international relations and for locating Asia within the larger international system and comparing it with other parts of the world.

What distinguishes this type of work is that the scholars are not turning Asia into a mere test bed of Western social science theory. Rather, they are identifying processes from an Asian and other local settings that could be used to explain events and phenomena in the outside world. These constructs are considered exceptionalist, but in reality they are not. For example, consensus decision-making is a worldwide practice of multilateral institutions.

But they do acquire a certain myth of distinctiveness in local contexts and are recognized and accepted as such. We might be a little partial to the second type of contribution, but leave the ultimate judgement to the scholars in the field, including those who have contributed to this volume.

The diversity of opinions expressed on the subject at the Singapore Workshop is itself healthy, and would help develop the kind of critical reflections that will open the door to a greater sensitivity to the need for theory in studies of Asian international relations. The extent of non-Western IR literature focusing on distinctive praxis remains a potentially rich source, although it is limited.

And with few exceptions, neither type of work has been attempted in Asia by Asians. Theoretical work by Asian scholars seems to be concerned mostly with testing Western IR theory on an Asian national or regional setting.

Countless graduate dissertations by Asian scholars in American universities testify to this trend. Such type of work — in which Western local patterns have been turned into IRT concepts — is commonplace in the West.

Hence, the question: Yet such work, if and when attempted by non-Westerners, would beg the ques- tion — another subject of heated debate at the Singapore Workshop — have they been simply been co-opted into Western IRT, or have they in some sense transcended it, and made contributions that could be counted as distinctively non-Western variants of originally Western ideas?

One candidate here would be dependency theory Frank ; Smith This was supposed to be a theory derived from the experience of Third World countries. But this too became an over-generalized framework, in some way reinforcing the neglect of the non-West in IRT by deny- ing it any autonomy. Shamir Amin or Cardoso were followers of an essentially Western theory, but they did not simply stop at theory-testing as happens in Korea, Taiwan or Japan , but advanced some of their own ideas as well.

A stronger claim for an indigenous theory is postcolonialism. Homi Bhaba on subaltern studies and Arjun Appadurai who writes on globalization. They are rebelling against orientalism and Western dominance, and hence are largely negative in their inspiration. Edward Said had made similar criticisms, accusing Foucault of neglecting not only European imperialism, but also resistance to imperialism outside of Europe.

These are useful contributions in the search for a non-Western IRT. But postcolonialism cannot be regarded as an authentic attempt to counter Western-centrism, because, as Arif Dirlik points out, it is basically framed within cultural discourses originating from the West. In other words, postcolonialism seeks not to produce fresh knowledges about what was until recently called the Third World but to restructure existing bodies of knowledge into the post- structuralist paradigms and to occupy sites of cultural production outside the Euro-American zones by globalizing concerns and orientations originating at the central sites of Euro-American cultural production.

Ahmed Explanations for the dominance of the West There is little doubt that Western IRT is massively dominant, and it is important to understand why this is so. There are many possible explanations, some of which leave little or no room or reason for remedial action, and others of which suggest the condition of Western dominance is likely to be temporary. The following list covers the main possibilities that could in principle explain a distortion on such a scale.

Western IRT has discovered the right path to understanding IR If true, this explanation would put IRT on a par with physics, chemistry and mathematics, whose theories can reasonably claim universal standing regardless of cultural context. This book would then have no point other than to exhort non- Westerners to engage themselves more in the established theoretical debates. One would not expect the laws of physics, or IR, to vary just because they were being discussed by Asians rather than Westerners, but one might well expect a larger body of participants to improve the quality of criticism, insight and application.

It is only begin- ning to come to terms with the wider range of possibilities such as identity, honour, tradition etc. There can be no doubt that Western IRT has generated significant insights and deserves to be taken seriously by all who are interested in the subject.

But equally, there can be no doubt that it is rooted in a very specific history, and that a more world historical perspective should open up additional perspectives. There is also the Coxian view set out above, that because social theory is always for someone and for some purpose, it is to its very core, and unavoidably, a political enterprise. To the extent that they are accepted, theories such as balance of power, hegemonic stability, democratic peace or unipolarity cannot help but construct the world they purport to describe.

There may be room for argument about the balance of effects between material and social factors, but it would require a heroic com- mitment to pure materialism to argue that it did not matter whether or not people accepted these ideas as true.

To accept the world is now unipolar, as many do, not only forecloses other ways of understanding international order, but automatically puts the US in a unique and privileged position.

The acceptance would produce effects even if in material terms unipolarity was not an accurate description of how things are. The consequential impossibility of detaching social theory from the reality it addresses means it must always matter who it is that generates IR theory. The extreme dominance of Anglo-American voices in IRT should not be, and is not, viewed without suspicion, namely the quote from E.

Carr discussed in Section 2 above. It is about whether, because Western IRT has been carried by the domin- ance of Western power over the last few centuries, it has acquired a Gramscian hegemonic status that operates largely unconsciously in the minds of others, and regardless of whether the theory is correct or not. Here one would need to take into account the intellectual impact of Western imperialism and the success of the powerful in imprinting their own understandings onto the minds and practices of the non-Western world.

The price of independence was that local elites accept this structure, and a good case can be made that they not only did so under duress, but absorbed and made their own a whole set of key Western ideas about the practice of political economy, including most con- spicuously and most universally, sovereignty, territoriality and nationalism. Buzan Western ideas such as democracy, the market and human rights have had a more contested, less universal reception, but nonetheless have become widespread and influential outside the West.

Third World elites have embraced the key elements of Westphalian sovereignty and even expanded its scope. For example, the doctrine of non-intervention, a key subsidiary norm of Westphalian sovereignty, is being vigorously contested in the West, and has suffered some erosion, but in the Third World, it has remained robust.

In fact, the decline of non-intervention in the West has paralleled its rise in the Third World. If Western IRT is hegemonic because it is right, then there is little scope for non-Western contributions. But if it is dominant because it rode on the back of Western power, then there is both room and reason to develop a non-Western voice.

Particularly significant here may be the extent to which Western imperialism not only overwhelmed local traditions of thought and knowledge, but also cut peoples off from their own history by drawing their self-understanding into a Western his- torical frame. Perhaps also significant is a consciousness of Western hegemony, a desire to avoid being ensnared by it, and an avoidance of engagement with theory precisely because it entails a risk of such ensnarement.

Non-Western IR theories do exist, but are hidden There is, of course, a possibility that non-Western IR theories do exist, but that they are hidden from the Western discourse by language barriers or other entry dif- ficulties and therefore do not circulate in the global debates. It is far from clear, for example, that theoretical debates conducted, say, in Japanese, would find much if any audience in China or India.

Even in Europe, there are distinct local language IR debates in Germany, France and elsewhere that are only partially, and often quite weakly, linked to the English language debates Friedrichs Those engaged in the English language debates have more than enough to read within that, and often lack the language skills to investigate beyond it. Those with the language skills are mainly located in area studies, an approach that generally focuses on the uniqueness of the area under study, and so carries a low interest in general theory.

The reasons for being hidden may also lie in intended or unintended barriers to entry to the Western discourses. Is there a lack of receptiveness to non-Western contributions arisen from the ethnocentrism of Western scholarship, and its tend- ency to view the reality of others through its own experience, and to assume the superiority of its own cultural model over others?

See Acharya An interesting attempt to bring in a Latin American perspective is Tickner It is also easy for those in the Anglo-Saxon IR core to assume that English as a lingua franca must make access easier for all. The amount of time and energy such persons may have to invest to get something published in a mainstream IR journal could be several times what they would have to spend to publish it in their own language.

It is easy for Anglophones to forget that there are large IR communities in Japan, Germany, France and elsewhere within which individuals can make a perfectly satisfying career. If non-Western theory does exist, but is marginalized, then the purpose of this book is to reveal that existence, and the problem is not to create such theory but to get it into wider circulation. Is it the case that the contributions of non-Western scholars remain hidden from view because of their inability to publish in the lead- ing journals in the field, nearly all of which are edited in the West?

The themes of articles published in these journals are heavily weighted in favour of Western issues, theories and settings, both historical and contemporary. Non-Western con- tributors to these journals tend to be rare, and those who do make it usually are based in the West.

When Western IR scholars rebel against Western dominance, they usually target American dominance, especially its rational choice positiv- ism.

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The alternatives they identify tend to be British and European and to some extent Australian rather than Asian see, for example Smith ; Crawford and Jarvis ; Ikenberry and Mastanduno The Ikenberry and Mastanduno volume contains only a single Asian contributor. Local conditions discriminate against the production of IR theory There are various local conditions — historical, cultural, political and institutional — that could explain why the academic environment outside the West might not be conducive to the generation of IR theory.

The unexpected horror, cost, destruction and disruption of the —18 war took Western civilization by surprise, and filled it with the fear that a renewal of all-out war might herald the end of Western civil- ization. These origins meant that right from the start, IR generally, and IR theory in particular, was endowed with a strong problem-solving orientation.

Liberalism and realism were both, in their different ways, responses to the problem that fear of war had become equal to, or greater than, fear of defeat. From that fear grew the need for a better understanding of peace and war and it was around that goal that the field of IR was institutionalized. It may well be true that this particular historical trauma is unique to the West, and shaped and motivated the development of its IR theory in a particular way.

And if historical trauma is a necessary midwife for the birth of IR theory, then the experience of Western domination and decolonization should have been more than adequate to serve.

Buzan clear that non-Western societies lack similarly forceful mobilizing historical traumas. Probing deeper, one can ask whether there are cultural differences between the West and the non-West that make the former more generally inclined to approach issues in abstract terms, and the latter less inclined.

In its strong form, the idea would be that theory in general is a Western way of doing things, with others more inclined either to empirical approaches or abstractions related mainly to local affairs, and without the presumption to universalism typical of Western social theory.

On the face of it, it seems highly unlikely that this strong version would apply only to IRT, so any such factor should be visible at least across the social sciences. This brute fact leaves room for the idea that IR might be in some respects culturally specific. In its weaker version the culture explanation would simply be that theory, especially universal theory, is a kind of luxury that societies struggling with the immediate and pressing problems of development simply cannot afford to indulge.

The focus would all be on short-term local problem solving perhaps typically foreign policy analysis for the state concerned, or at most regional level , and not on more grandiose efforts to understand larger systems. There could also be a link between culture and the hegemony explanation. One consequence of hegemony could be to induce in the local cultures a kind of radical demoralization and loss of confidence that would make it particularly difficult to engage in general theoretical debates.

Conversely, hegemony would encourage exactly such theorizing from those in the dominant position. Distinct from cultural logics, but possibly related to them, are political factors that might inhibit the development of IRT.

In the West, IR theory has flourished most successfully in democracies, though the existence of more or less IRT-free zones in substantial countries such as Italy and Spain suggests democracy is more of a necessary than a sufficient condition. Other than in a narrow party-line sense, one would not expect IRT to flourish in totalitarian states where the government has a strong political interest in controlling how foreign policy and the structure of international relations are understood.

The experience of the Soviet Union per- haps exemplifies the limits here. There is evidence from European history that authoritarian states are not necessarily hostile to social theorists e. Kant , but this perhaps depends on the presence of an enlightened despot. It is, in general, an interesting question as to whether or not undemocratic governments are sufficiently sensitive to IRT so as to inhibit its development within their domain.

It is perhaps worth noting that the typical Western academic experience is that governments could not care less about IRT, pay little or no attention to it, and certainly do not consider it a threat to their authority. They will occasionally pick up elements of it to adorn specific policies e. Perhaps the closest connections are possible in the US system, where it is not all that uncommon for academic theorists to play significant roles in government e. This connection, however, almost certainly has much less to do with their standing as theorists, and much more to do with their willingness to pursue political activism within the party sys- tem.

As a rule, it is perhaps fair to say the more closely linked the study of IR is to government and foreign policy establishments, the less theoretical it is likely to be. IR and foreign policy think tanks are generally averse to theory, and much more interested in, and encouraging of, focused empirical work relevant to the issues of the day. Perhaps the one exception to this has been in relation to strategic theory, where there was strong interplay between government and academic thinking about nuclear deterrence.

The final local condition that may discriminate against the development of IRT is institutional. By this we mean things to do with the resourcing, workloads, career structures and intellectual ethos of those, mainly academics, who might be expected to do IRT.

In Western academia, research is encouraged by the career structure: Such research is, up to a point, funded, and again up to a point, time is built into the career structure for research.

Other resources such as IT and libraries are generally adequate to support research. If all, or even some, of these conditions are not present, then one would not expect academia to generate theory. If research generally, or theory work in particular, are not esteemed, then they will not be produced. If they are esteemed, but academics have too much teaching and administration, and too few resources, they will still not be produced. This institutional explanation might be related to the cultural one in the sense of absence of a research culture, but it might be more a question of inadequate resources.

There might also be quite particular local rea- sons to do with how IR was introduced into a country, who the founding leaders were and what the disciplinary links were that could work against the development of IRT. In the Anglo-American IR world, IR has been most closely linked with political science, a discipline quite strongly inclined towards theorizing. But IR can and has been linked to less theoretically inclined disciplines such as history, law and area studies.

Links of that sort might well build a theoretical or even anti- theoretical inclinations into a local IR community, whereas links to sociology and political science would tend to encourage a more theoretical bent. The West has a big head start, and what we are seeing is a period of catching up If this explanation is true, then the main problem is a question of time and resources.

Where there are resources available for the study of IR we should expect to see, depending on the level of resources available, the steady unfolding of local developments in IR theory. Where such resources are available, we should expect to see the gap between West and non-West closing, and it might not be unreason- able to expect this gap would close more or less in line with the pace of catch-up in the wider process of modernization.

The difference for state development and IRT is that the non-West has to perform its development in the shadow of ongoing Western domination and penetration. These explanations are, of course, not all mutually exclusive.

It is not difficult to imagine, for example, a combination of Western hegemony, inconducive local conditions and engagement in catch-up.

Expectations of the pace of catch-up could be frustrated by unhelpful local conditions. One aim of the chapters that follow is to weigh the balance of these explanations in specific cases, and perhaps to add others to them. The structure of the volume The chapters included in the volume, covering both individual countries China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia , as well as a regional study of Southeast Asia and a thematic focus on Islamic IR worldview that pays particular attention to the Arab world, have quite different stories to tell, but each in its own way touches on the following themes: How do the key Western IR concepts such as sovereignty, statehood, legitimacy, balance of power, international law, justice, war, diplomacy, nationalism, private property and great power fit or not fit with local traditions and practices?

Are there indi- genous political or strategic traditions, beliefs and practices that may have no equivalent in Western IRT, but which did and may continue to influence local political beliefs and practices relevant to IR? Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? Asian Security Practice: Anderson, Benedict , Imagined Communities. Appadurai, Arjun , Modernity at Large: Carr, E. Keohane ed.

Crawford, Robert A. Fairbank, John K. Geertz, Clifford , Negara: Goldgeiger, J. Goldstein, J. Hobson, John M. Huntington, Samuel P. Ikenberry, G. Leach, Edmund R. Legge, John David , Sukarno: Mittleman, James H. Scott, James C. Tickner, Arlene B. Wolters, O. Notes 1 We are grateful to Tang Shiping for this observation. In addition, China is a land with long intellectual traditions and has been a major international player in history. Then, why is there no Chinese international relations theory?

In this chapter, I try to provide a tentative answer to this question and argue that there is a great potential for a Chinese school of IRT to emerge.

Social theory: A system of ideas Theory is a system of ideas. Most authoritative dictionaries define theory as a system of generalizations, able to account for facts and associated with practice Oxford Once we enter the field of international relations, we immediately face two definitions of the- ory, though neither is a complete violation of the general definition provided by authoritative dictionaries.

As Acharya and Buzan state in the introductory chap- ter, there are two kinds of theory: Even though American and European IR theories have many different features, they follow the general definition that a theory is a system of generalizations.

In this sense, they are different in degrees rather than in essence. The general agreement about theory is valid for both. Kenneth Waltz is perhaps at the hardest extreme.

For him, theory must be sys- tematic, causally valid and rigorously simple Waltz His structural realism is a telling example of a Newtonian nature, a neat self-sustaining system containing the structure defined in terms of power distribution and the units of nation-states interacting in anarchy Waltz When he draws an artificial sphere to make international politics a distinct subject, he is constructing a theory that is systematic in nature.

Even though it may not be an explanatory system, it is quite often an interpretive one. It seems widely accepted that in theorizing, a typical and defining feature is that a theory itself is a system. In his well known article, Martin Wight, having discussed the four sources of international theory, i.

For most scholars who are members of the English School, it is, implicitly or explicitly, accepted that theory is a system, a systematic set of generalizations. Despite the differences in epistemology and methodology, the various IR theories are defined by a systematic organization of ideas, concepts and categories that structure explanations, accounts or interpretations of inter- national phenomena.

Even deconstructivism, which argues against any form of logo-centrism, constructs its own theoretical system while trying to deconstruct the hegemonic domination of the Western logo-centric tradition.

In the Chinese context, theory has two meanings. One is action-oriented, defining theory as a guidance for action. The other is knowledge-oriented, defining theory as a perspective to understand the world and as an achievement of knowledge production or reproduction, such as the theory of Giddens, Waltz and Bull. In this paper, I use the second definition and take theory as knowledge- oriented. According to this definition, theory-related research is of three different, but related types.

First, original theory, which is new theory incommensurable to the existing theories Type I ; second, introductory and critical analysis of an original theory Type II ; and third, theory application and testing Type III. The distinct feature of original theory is that it contains core assumptions that are not commen- surable with core assumptions in another distinct theory.

If the core component is different, then it can be a distinct research program or meta-theory or paradigm. Introductory and critical analysis of an original theory contains no such distinctions and develops no new theory, but either presents a good account or valuable criti- cism of an original theory. The third type includes many tests of original theory. Its merits lie in the verification and falsification of the theory concerned through applying it to social reality.

When we say that there is no Chinese IR theory, we use the knowledge-based meaning of theory and the first type of theory as the defining standard. IR discipline in China: In this section, I will discuss three factors — the institutional development, the contribution by translation and the research in the Chinese IR community.

I argue that Type I theory is yet to emerge in China though great progress has been made and there is a great potential for a Chinese school of IRT. The first stage is from to Two years later, it was re-established as an independent institution, the Foreign Affairs College.

Later on, two other institutes were established: Disciplinary development was not the priority of their work. Liang The characteristic feature of this stage was the establishment of the three departments of international politics in three major universities in China, namely Peking University, Remin University and Fudan University. The three departments had a division of labour: Peking University for the study of the national liberation movements in the Third World; Renmin University for the study of the communist movements in the world; and Fudan University for the study of IR in the Western world.

This pattern lasted until when China started its reform under Deng Xiaoping. The third stage is from to the present. This is the period when international relations as a discipline has witnessed its greatest development in China. The reform and opening up has offered the Chinese IR community a good opportunity to have extensive exchanges with the rest of the world. Institutions have mush- roomed in China. Up to , there had been only three university departments and three specialized institutes doing IR-related education and research.

The demand since , thanks to the opening of the country, has been enormous. In , the National Association of the History of International Relations was set up as the first nationwide academic association. The most recent membership statistics of CNAIS show that among Chinese universities and research institutes, 54 have bachelor or master degree programmes and 29 have doctoral degree programmes in International Relations. Learning through translation At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first Chinese students who had stud- ied in Europe, the US and Japan started the learning process through translation.

A famous scholar-translator, Yan Fu, made great contributions to the Chinese academic and intellectual development by translating Adam Smith, Mill and many other Western thinkers. Since IR is a relatively young discipline in the West, the effort for translation has been made since Five major series of translations are particularly influential. The first translation series began to come out in and the translation of Hans J.

It was 42 years after its first edition was published in Although the translation had at least a year time lag, the consciousness about theories as schemes of ideas and as explanations of IR phenomena began to emerge. This is a watershed, for only when the IR community distinguishes between the two concepts, i.

IR research as an academic endeavour or as a policy tool, can theory-consciousness come into being. In the mid- to lates, translation was paid even greater attention. It was consciously realized there was a domination of realism in the IR discourse in China and the learning process was very much leaning toward the misperception that real- ism was the IR theory.

The end of the Cold War heightened this awareness. New efforts were made to introduce theories other than realism. Liberalism, constructiv- ism and other classics have been consciously introduced through translation Qin a: Four more series of translations have come out since then: Table 2.

Altogether, the five series have enabled 53 important Western IRT works to be translated into Chinese. Most of them have been done in the past five years. To some extent, it is translation that gave Chinese IR scholars a push for establishing an independent academic discipline.

It is also translation that has made many Chinese scholars, especially the younger ones, follow the standards of the Western IR discipline. By the end of the twentieth century, almost all the major Western theories were introduced to the Chinese IR community and to graduate programmes at the same time as they were published.

There is almost no time lag now. Burton, Global Conflict: Hsiung, Anarchy and Order Barry Buzan et al. Odell, Negotiating the World Economy 11 books cont. Rulers, States and War Paul Kennedy ed. Qin process is much quickened, paralleling the newest developments of IR theory in the world. Realism, liberalism, constructivism, the English School and other important Western IR theories have all come into China and found their spokespersons in the Chinese IR community.

A map of major theories is drawn, although a detailed map is still needed. Progress in research programmes To understand the progress made in the Chinese IR community, it is necessary to distinguish a three-phased theoretical development: During the pre-theory phase, there is no consciousness about theory and research is done mainly by individual experiences and intellectual wisdom.

There may be many relevant thoughts, but there is no conscious effort to turn the thoughts into a systematically constructed theoretical paradigm. Usually, the discipline concerned is mixed with other disciplines with no distinct identity. The theory-learning phase is introduced when the academic community in the relevant field starts to have a collective consciousness and begins to produce an agenda for the second and third types of theory-related research.

During this phase, there are an increasing number of research products that are clearly related to intro- duction and critical analysis of major theories Type II , and there are research products that test major theories with the purpose of verification or falsification Type III. New ideas may emerge, but no new theory that contains distinct core assumptions emerges. When there are already theories in the field in other national academic communities, it is most likely that scholars in one national academic community learn from their counterparts in other national communities.

But this learning alone can hardly lead to a distinct theory. The third phase is one of creation because new theory is put forward with dis- tinct core assumptions and serves as a powerful explanation of the reality. When there is no ready theory in the academic field concerned, scholars may turn to get inspiration from other related fields.

When a national community reaches the third phase, we may say that a new school of thought has emerged and we may name it after the nation. It is reasonable to say that —89 was the first phase, or the pre-theory stage. Since theory was understood mainly as the policy and strategy put forward by political leaders, few in the academic circles had the consciousness and the luxury to think about theory in the knowledge-based sense. Some journals with a focus on international relations existed and were created, but the articles carried in them show that almost all of them were policy interpretation, background information and a description of current international events.

Almost no theories were intro- duced from outside China. The second phase is from to the present and three features stand out in this stage. The most conspicuous feature of these 15 years is an increasingly clear separation of policy interpretation and academic research.

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In fact, in the late s, the Chinese IR community began to realize that theory was not only a guideline for policy making, but also a perspective from which people observe the IR world, a hypothesis by which people test their abstraction of the IR world and a general- ization through which people understand the IR world. The second conspicuous feature of this phase is the mushrooming of publications Table 2. Qin that have been going together with the translations. Articles poured out in academic journals, introducing and criticizing theories from outside China.

The journal Europe took the lead in setting up a column exclusively for IR theory. Other jour- nals, such as World Economics and Politics, also began to pay great attention and made contributions to this learning process.

The development of social construct- ivism in China is a telling example. By the end of February , there had been seven academic monographs including three translated works, two monographs and two IR theory books that include constructivism and 42 journal articles including 4 translated ones, 28 theory analyses and 10 case studies Yang The third feature is that the research covers a range almost as wide as that in countries outside China. A recent study shows that in the period between and Table 2.

Why is there no Chinese international relations theory? The greatest significance of the second phase is the awareness of IR theory as a knowledge-oriented construct rather than a mere tool for policy interpretation. The greatest advancement is the practice of applying Western IR theory to Chinese issues. The awareness and practice, however, have been achieved through a ten- acious learning process mainly through translation of Western classics, which has further enhanced the dominant role of Western IR theory.

The second stage is thus characterized by the modernizing programme in IR through applying the Enlightenment ideas. The research programmes have been getting increasingly close to those of the Western IR theory. As for the third phase, the stage of theory creation, there have been some positive signs, but its full appearance is yet to come. The defining feature of the third stage should be the emergence of new IR theory.

So far, the consciousness of developing a Chinese school of IR theory has been increasingly awakened Qin , together with a continued reinforcement of the Western definition and conceptualization of theory.

There is no such theory that can be called Chinese IR theory yet. Thus, now in China, we have a discipline of international relations, but it is a discipline without theory of its own. Why is there no Chinese IRT? Both at home and abroad, there has been a lot of discussion about how to develop IR theory in China Wang ; Johnston China is a land where there are long intellectual traditions and international relations has been a highly attractive discipline in recent years with a rapid increase in IR programs as well as in the number of students working towards various levels of academic degrees.

Thus, the fact that China has so far no major IR theory is conspicuous and puzzling Zi Then, why is there no IRT that has originated in China? Three factors stand conspicuous in this respect: Qin dominance of the Western IRT discourse and the absence of a theoretical hard core. I will discuss them in turn. The world or the state in the Chinese culture was not a clearly defined entity with a finite boundary. The Chinese world referred to every- thing under the heaven and on the earth.

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